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Introduction 
 
Death row inmates around the country have challenged the constitutional-
ity of the lethal injection procedures by which they will be executed. This litiga-
tion often turns up serious problems, which create a significant risk that the 
inmate will suffer an excruciating death in apparent violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”1 With a few 
notable exceptions, however, courts have been reluctant to intervene, explicitly 
deferring to state officials responsible for these procedures and upholding the 
execution protocols.  
Judicial reluctance to strike down states’ lethal injection procedures is 
closely tied to judges’ anxieties about issuing an appropriate remedy should 
they find a constitutional flaw. Judges’ decisions upholding current procedures, 
in other words, often reflect less about those procedures’ safety and more about 
the difficulty of identifying a workable remedy. There are, of course, some lethal 
injection plaintiffs who are unable to identify plausible dangers.2 In such cases, 
judges are justified in upholding state procedures (assuming that the plaintiff 
has had access to the relevant records during discovery). But other lawsuits 
identify serious flaws, and courts still decline to interfere. Fearful that any rem-
edy would appear to usurp the political branches’ province and exceed judges’ 
core competence, these courts let remedial concerns color their findings on the 
merits.  
Several recent cases reflect these remedial anxieties. In the Supreme Court’s 
2008 splintered decision in Baze v. Rees, for instance, the three-Justice plurality 
explicitly required the lethal injection plaintiff to proffer a “feasible, readily im-
plemented” alternative as part of his affirmative case.3 It, therefore, conditioned 
the Eighth Amendment right on the existence of a workable remedy.  
The plurality then drew further on remedial concerns, warning that judicial 
involvement in states’ lethal injection procedures would “threaten to transform 
courts into boards of inquiry charged with determining ‘best practices’ for exe-
 
1. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
2. By “danger,” I mean a condition creating a significant risk of excruciating pain. 
3. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
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cutions.”4 The plurality argued that such a remedy—requiring states to adopt 
the “best practice”—would immerse the judiciary in an area best left to the po-
litical branches.5 But the plurality overstated the intrusion, ignoring the fact that 
a court finding an Eighth Amendment violation need not require the “best 
practice.” To the contrary, more modest remedies can cure a lethal injection 
procedure’s risks without interfering so much with the state’s prerogative. The 
Court, therefore, misconstrued the remedial issue and then used those remedial 
concerns to narrow the scope of the underlying Eighth Amendment right. 
Lower courts have also cited and misconstrued remedial issues. One court 
identified serious flaws in a state’s lethal injection procedure but nevertheless 
declined to find a formal violation and issue a remedy because “under the doc-
trines of comity and separation of powers, the particulars of [a state’s] lethal-
injection protocol are and should remain the province of the state’s executive 
branch.”6 Even confronted with the state procedure’s manifest problems, the 
court’s overriding concern was to “permit Defendants to proceed with Plain-
tiff’s execution as scheduled.”7 And that court at least did identify serious prob-
lems. More often, courts presented with lethal injection cases avoid engaging 
with the details of the procedure, explaining instead that the judicial “role is not 
to micromanage the executive branch in fulfilling its own duties relating to exe-
cutions.”8  
Remedial concerns then shift the Eighth Amendment’s focus in method-of-
execution cases from the inmate’s risk of pain to the difficulty the state might 
have reforming its method. Of course, some attention to remedy is appropriate, 
because the words “cruel and unusual” invite a comparative inquiry. Courts, 
however, have distorted this remedial inquiry, drawing false assumptions about 
remedial options and concluding that any remedy would necessarily be inap-
propriate. This distortion gives states incentives not to reform broken proce-
dures but instead to argue that doing so would be too cumbersome. It also al-
lows courts to uphold procedures that are not only dangerous but also the 
product of serious political process failures undeserving of judicial deference. 
Indeed, several states have given little attention to these procedures’ design, 
delegated the procedure to unqualified personnel, failed to consult experts, 
concealed the details of the procedure from the public, and obdurately refused 
to reconsider their practices even as serious problems have come to light.  
In giving so much attention to remedial concerns and so much deference to 
the political branches, courts are often not distinguishing between disingenuous 
 
4. Id. at 1531. 
5. Id. 
6. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 975-76 (N.D. Cal. 2006) [hereinafter 
Morales II] (quoting Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) [hereinafter Morales I]). 
7. Id. at 975 (quoting Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1047).  
8. Lightborne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 351 (Fla. 2007). 
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suits manufactured to delay the inevitable execution and legitimate complaints 
identifying serious flaws with a state’s method of execution. Courts, in other 
words, are adopting a blanket deference that makes it more difficult for even the 
strongest cases to get a fair hearing. Given some states’ lack of care and trans-
parency in this area, such deference is unwarranted.  
Part I of this Article introduces the three-drug lethal injection procedure 
used in most states. Specifically, it explains how haphazard practices and un-
trained, unqualified personnel greatly heighten the risk that the procedure will 
cause an excruciating death. It then summarizes the Supreme Court’s 2008 de-
cision in Baze v. Rees upholding Kentucky’s three-drug protocol.9 Seven differ-
ent Justices wrote separately in Baze, and no opinion garnered more than three 
votes. This Part explores the state of the law in light of this fractured decision.  
Part II argues that remedial concerns figure prominently in recent lethal in-
jection decisions, including Baze, and in fact often drive the outcome. Courts 
both explicitly and implicitly shape the scope of the Eighth Amendment right 
by looking to whether there might be appropriate remedies. In so doing, courts 
often incorrectly assume that any remedy would greatly burden the state. The 
remedial inquiry, then, is colored by a general reluctance to tell the political 
branches what to do, which grows out of more general discomfort with institu-
tional remedies, particularly structural reform injunctions. While most courts 
do not explicitly equate lethal injection suits with structural reform litigation, 
lethal injection actions do inquire into the structure—the personnel, architec-
ture, and processes—of states’ execution procedures. Accordingly, deep-seated 
judicial attitudes about invasive structural injunctions color courts’ approaches 
to lethal injection suits.  
Part III argues that this judicial reluctance to impose remedies against the 
government is misplaced. Many states have not given much thought to the de-
tails of their lethal injection procedures. While respect for democracy might be 
an appropriate reason for courts to decline to intervene in some instances, it is 
not here, where there has been nothing democratic, deliberative, or transparent 
about the creation of execution protocols. Quite to the contrary, where states 
have delegated responsibility for their procedures to unelected, unqualified exe-
cution team members and then concealed the details of that procedure from the 
public, judicial interference is entirely appropriate.  
Given that judicial intervention is necessary, Part IV argues that viable  
lethal injection remedies are more workable and less intrusive than many courts 
seem to assume. This Part suggests particular remedies that would help cure an 
execution protocol’s difficulties. It then contends that such remedies would be 
relatively modest compared with many public law injunctions and would not 
unduly burden the political branches. Calls for judicial deference, then, are 
overstated in this area.  
This Article concludes that some courts have not been sensitive enough to 
the distinctions between different types of public law litigation. They have 
blindly assumed that any suit seeking an injunction to reform state practices is 
 
9. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). 
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inherently intrusive. Courts should recognize that some injunctions reshaping 
public practices can be relatively unintrusive and wholly appropriate. Indeed, 
because remedial concerns often figure heavily in courts’ articulation of the 
constitutional right itself, it is crucial that judges appreciate these nuances in the 
early stages of an action. This appreciation is all the more important in the  
lethal injection context as courts address the scope of the Eighth Amendment 
right in light of the muddled Baze decision. In failing to account for these fac-
tors thus far, some courts have blessed dangerous state practices and surren-
dered their own constitutional responsibility to oversee the other branches.  
 
I. An Overview of Lethal Injection 
 
A. The Three-Drug Protocol 
 
Over the past few years, litigation has uncovered numerous flaws in states’ 
lethal injection procedures.10 Lawyers typically bring these constitutional chal-
lenges under the Eighth Amendment, which reads, “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted.”11 Lethal injection plaintiffs typically do not claim that the death penalty 
is unconstitutional or that lethal injection is unconstitutional per se, but rather 
that the particular lethal injection procedure administered in a given jurisdic-
tion violates the Eighth Amendment.12  
Courts agree that if a method of execution causes excruciating pain or the 
significant risk of such pain, it violates the Eighth Amendment whenever a fea-
 
10. An expert anesthesiologist has also identified numerous flaws in the federal lethal 
injection procedure, which is the subject of ongoing litigation. See, e.g., Heath 
Declaration, Roane v. Gonzales (D.D.C.) (No. 05-2337) [hereinafter Heath Roane 
Decl.] (recounting several problems with the federal lethal injection procedure). 
Challenges to federal and state procedures present similar factual and legal issues, 
although obviously federalism concerns differ. For ease of presentation, this Arti-
cle refers to the defendants collectively as “states.” 
11. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence consists of 
roughly four categories of cases: (1) the prohibition of certain punishments 
deemed to be painful and inhumane; (2) punishments that are unconstitutional 
because they are disproportionate to the crimes for which they are imposed; (3) 
“death is different” cases, which require special due process rules for death sen-
tences; and (4) inhumane prison conditions cases. Youngjae Lee, The Constitu-
tional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 Va. L. Rev. 677, 678-79 (2005). This 
Article focuses on the first category. 
12. Note that while most method-of-execution challenges arise under the U.S. Con-
stitution, some have been decided under state constitutional law or state statutory 
law. See State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 261-62 (Neb. 2008) (holding Nebraska’s 
form of electrocution unconstitutional under the Nebraska constitution); Ohio v. 
Rivera, No. 04-65940, slip op. at 10 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 2008) (holding 
that Ohio’s lethal injection procedure violated a state statute requiring that lethal 
injection be completed “quickly and painlessly”). 
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sible alternative exists.13 Despite early Supreme Court cases reviewing the con-
stitutionality of various methods of execution,14 the legal standard for such an 
Eighth Amendment lethal injection claim was unclear before the Court’s recent 
decision in Baze v. Rees and arguably remains unclear today. Nevertheless, al-
though pre-Baze cases sometimes disagreed about the precise legal standard, 
parties and courts generally focused on whether a lethal injection procedure 
created an unnecessary risk of pain.15 This inquiry is unconcerned with the risk 
of unforeseeable accident.16 
Lethal injection is the sole or primary method of execution in thirty-six of 
the country’s thirty-seven death penalty states and for the federal government.17 
 
13. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531-32 (2008) (requiring a substantial risk of 
harm and a viable alternative for an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Evans 
v. Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (D. Md. 2006) (asking “whether an inmate facing 
execution has shown that he is subject to an unnecessary risk of unconstitutional 
pain or suffering”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cooey v. Taft, 430 F. 
Supp. 2d 702, 708 (S.D. Ohio 2006); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974 
(N.D. Cal. 2006). The law recognizes and tolerates, however, that “[s]ome risk of 
pain is inherent in any method of execution—no matter how humane—if only 
from the prospect of error in following the required procedure.” Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 
1529. 
14. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (“The cruelty 
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the 
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method em-
ployed to extinguish life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident pre-
vented the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add an 
element of cruelty to a subsequent execution.”); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 
(1890) (“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; 
but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used 
in the Constitution.”); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-37 (1878) (upholding 
constitutionality of execution by firing squad); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 102 (1976) (holding that Eighth Amendment bars punishments “incompatible 
with the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)); Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 430 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing commentary which stated that 
“no court would approve any method of implementation of the death sentence 
found to involve unnecessary cruelty in light of presently available alternatives”); 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (stating that the Eighth Amend-
ment is “progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning 
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice”). 
15. See generally Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 880 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (noting 
that the Eighth Amendment “forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the exe-
cution of the death sentence” (quoting Resweber, 329 U.S. at 67)); Taylor v. Craw-
ford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (same). 
16. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464; Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1080 (8th Cir. 2007); 
Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 687 (9th Cir. 1994). 
17. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1526-27 & n.1 (2008). Nebraska is the only death penalty state 
specifying electrocution as the sole method of execution, but the Nebraska Su-
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The federal government and at least thirty states use the same three-drug se-
quence.18 The first of these drugs, thiopental (otherwise known as sodium pen-
tothal), is an ultra-short-acting barbiturate anesthetic. The second drug, pan-
curonium bromide (Pavulon), is a paralytic that inhibits muscle movement, 
including that of the diaphragm. The third drug, potassium chloride, induces 
cardiac arrest.19 
It is undisputed that if a full dose of thiopental is successfully delivered to 
the inmate’s veins, that inmate will be fully anesthetized within two-and-a-half 
minutes.20 It is also undisputed that if the thiopental fails to take effect, the po-
tassium chloride will cause excruciating pain as it sears its way through the  
inmate’s veins on the way to stopping his heart.21 If that were to happen, the 
inmate’s pain could be masked by the pancuronium. An inmate, then, could lie 
paralyzed, suffocating and experiencing intense burning in his veins, and yet 
appear peaceful.22  
 
preme Court recently found its electrocution procedure cruel and unusual under 
the Nebraska Constitution. See State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 261-62 (Neb. 2008). 
As of March 19, 2009, the Nebraska Legislature’s Judiciary Committee was debat-
ing a bill that would institute lethal injection as a new method of execution. See 
Paul Hammel, Legislative Panel Fails To Advance Lethal Injection Bill,  
Omaha World Herald, Mar. 19, 2009, available at http://www.omaha.com/ 
index.php?u_page=2798&u_sid=10589642. 
18. See, e.g., Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1527. It would be inaccurate to say that states use the 
same procedure, because the safety of the procedure turns in large part on how 
the drugs are administered. States using the same drugs can still have very differ-
ent procedures. 
  The words “protocol” and “procedure” in the lethal injection context are of-
ten used interchangeably. To the extent their meanings differ, “protocol” gener-
ally refers to the written document specifying the steps the State should take to 
administer the drugs, while “procedure” generally refers to the steps they actually 
take, including departures (either intentional or unintentional) from the written 
protocol. 
19. Mark Dershwitz & Thomas K. Henthorn, The Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacody-
namics of Thiopental as Used in Lethal Injection, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 931, 931 
(2008); Teresa A. Zimmers et al., Lethal Injection for Execution: Chemical As-
phyxiation?, 4 PLoS Med. 0646, 0646 (2007), http://medicine.plosjournals.org/ 
perlserv/?request=getdocument&doi=10.1371/ journal.pmed.0040156. 
20. Henthorn Expert Report ¶ 24, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1236660 
[hereinafter Henthorn Report] (expert anesthesiologist explaining speed with 
which thiopental takes effect); Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 19, at 933, 936. 
21. Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 880 (M.D. Tenn. 2007); Dershwitz & Hen-
thorn, supra note 19, at 931; Frank Romanelli et al., Issues Surrounding Lethal Injec-
tion as a Means of Capital Punishment, 28 Pharmacotherapy 1429, 1433 (2008). 
22. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1527; Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 883-84; Suzanne C. Beyea, 
Addressing the Trauma of Anesthesia Awareness, 81 Aorn J. 603, 603 (2005); Leoni-
das G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 365 
Lancet 1412, 1414 (2005). 
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If properly performed, the three-drug protocol will fully anesthetize the 
inmate for the duration of the execution. Such an execution would therefore be 
constitutional.23 The key question presented in these cases, then, is whether the 
first drug does take effect. The answer cannot be determined, however, by wit-
nesses or execution personnel watching the inmate. First, there are different 
planes of anesthesia, and a partially anesthetized person may be unresponsive to 
light stimuli, like gentle shaking, but still be able to feel stronger stimuli, like ex-
cruciating pain.24 Only a medical professional with training in anesthesiology 
sitting at a person’s elbow can accurately determine whether a person has 
reached a deep enough plane of anesthesia to be unresponsive to excruciating 
pain.25 Most states neither employ a professional with such training nor  
position their personnel so close to the inmate.26 Second, the administration of 
pancuronium paralyzes the inmate so that he looks serene even if he is not 
anesthetized.27 Lethal injection challenges thus often focus on the probability 
that the inmate will receive the full dose of thiopental in his veins and be fully 
anesthetized before the delivery of the second and third drugs.  
That likelihood hinges on how the three-drug procedure is carried out in 
each state. Because pancuronium masks pain and because many states do not 
take toxicology reports measuring thiopental blood levels immediately after 
death, there is no reliable data on how many inmates have suffered painful 
deaths. But as details about various states’ procedures emerge, it seems increas-
ingly probable that some states’ procedures have caused and will continue to 
cause torturous pain.28 
 
23. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530 (plurality opinion). A properly performed three-drug pro-
cedure might still involve pain from the insertion of the IV catheter into the in-
mate’s veins, but assuming that no unusually painful measures are needed to in-
sert the catheter, such as a cut-down procedure, that degree of pain would not 
amount to a constitutional violation. See id. (stating that an Eighth Amendment 
violation requires “something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the 
mere extinguishment of life” (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). 
24. Henthorn Report, supra note 20, ¶ 9; Colin A. Shanks et al., A Pharmacokinetic-
Pharmacodynamic Model for Quantal Responses with Thiopental, 21 J. Pharma-
cokinetics & Biopharmaceutics 309, 316 (1993). 
25. See, e.g., Taylor Trial Transcript at 71, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 
1236660 [hereinafter Taylor Trial Transcript] (testimony of expert anesthesiolo-
gist); Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 19, at 949; Atul Gawande et al., Physicians 
and Execution—Highlights from a Discussion of Lethal Injection, 358 New Eng. J. 
Med. 448, 450 (2008). 
26. See, e.g., Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 884-86; Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 
WL 1779035, at *7-9 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006). 
27. See, e.g., Beyea, supra note 22, at 603; Koniaris et al., supra note 22, at 1414. 
28. It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a detailed summary of all the 
problems that have been uncovered in various states. For a more detailed discus-
sion, see Professor Denno’s excellent articles. See generally Deborah W. Denno, 
The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 
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As an initial matter, it is important to note that death by lethal injection 
need not involve this combination of three drugs. The American Veterinary 
Medical Association (AVMA), for example, will not use the three-drug protocol 
when euthanizing animals, because the risk of pain is too great. Instead, it  
favors an overdose of the barbiturate pentobarbital that eliminates the risk of 
pain.29 If the injection of barbiturate fails to kill the animal, the veterinarian 
simply administers a second dose.30 Paralytics like pancuronium therefore play 
no role in animal euthanasia, and, indeed, have actually been statutorily banned 
in several states that nevertheless use those same drugs during the execution of 
humans.31 As Professor Alper puts it, “virtually all (97.6%) lethal injections in 
this country have taken place in states that have either implicitly or explicitly 
banned, for use in animal euthanasia, the same drugs that are used in those 
states during human executions.”32 Moreover, whereas veterinary consensus has 
resulted from decades of study, lethal injection procedures are not the products 
of any scientific review.33 To the contrary, they are often haphazardly conceived 
 
76 Fordham L. Rev. 49 (2007) [hereinafter Denno, Quandary] (examining how 
states ended up with constitutionally suspect lethal injection procedures); Deb-
orah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind 
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 Ohio 
St. L.J. 63, 90-120 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, Paradox] (questioning presumption 
that lethal injection is a constitutional method of execution). 
  I should emphasize that I am not suggesting that all lethal injection claims 
are necessarily meritorious. Although several states’ procedures are problematic, 
some may well be safe and painless. 
29. Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal Eutha-
nasia, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 817, 836-37 (2008). 
30. Id. at 836. 
31. See id. at 841-42 (noting that nine states—Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and Tennessee—explicitly ban 
the use of neuromuscular blocking agents in animal euthanasia, that another 
twenty-eight states implicitly ban the use of such drugs by mandating a particular 
method of euthanasia, and that many of these same states use pancuronium in 
their lethal injection procedures). 
32. Id. at 844. 
33. See id. at 834 (explaining that the AVMA updates its guidelines at least once every 
ten years by reviewing all scientific literature evaluating methods and potential 
methods of euthanasia); Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 70 (explaining that 
lethal injection procedures were never studied); Ellen Kreitzberg & David Richter, 
But Can It Be Fixed? A Look at Constitutional Challenges to Lethal Injection Execu-
tions, 47 Santa Clara L. Rev. 445, 459 (2007) (explaining that there has never 
been “critical re-evaluation” of a lethal injection procedure “to assess whether 
modern medical or scientific knowledge could improve the existing protocol”). 
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and performed, and this general lack of care creates the substantial risk that 
something will go wrong and cause severe pain.34  
Probably the most serious and complicated problem with many states’  
lethal injection procedures is the use of untrained and unqualified personnel.35 
The California District Court, for example, found that “[t]he [execution] team 
members almost uniformly have no knowledge of the nature or properties of 
the drugs that are used or the risks or potential problems associated with the 
procedure.”36 Such ignorance about the drugs is common. When executions 
take longer than expected in Virginia, the execution team inexplicably adminis-
ters more pancuronium and potassium, but not more thiopental.37 In other 
words, Virginia re-administers not anesthetic, but the drugs that mask and 
cause pain. In Missouri, the executioners injected the drugs as quickly as possi-
ble,38 mistakenly believing that thiopental renders a person fully unconscious 
within fifteen seconds.39 In reality, it may take up to two and a half minutes for 
thiopental to take full effect.40 Compounding these problems, states do not ade-
quately train their execution teams to make up for these deficiencies or even  
require their teams to read the execution protocol.41  
Such ignorance places special importance on the ostensible team leader. In 
Missouri, for instance, the only team member who claimed to understand the 
procedure was Dr. Alan Doerhoff (referred to in the litigation as “John Doe I”), 
 
34. See, e.g., Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 56-58 (summarizing haphazard and 
“disturbing” details about states’ lethal injection procedures). 
35. This discussion mostly characterizes the procedures as they existed in states dur-
ing recent litigation. Some states have changed their procedures recently, although 
most such changes are minor. 
36. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also Harbison v. 
Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 888-90 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (finding execution team 
members “largely ignorant” of the drugs’ risks). 
37. Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 296-97 (4th Cir. 2008). 
38. See Deposition of Larry Crawford, Taylor v. Crawford at 129-31, 2006 WL 1779035 
(W.D. Mo. May 23, 2006) (No. 05-4173) (containing explanation by DOC Director 
that drugs are injected in rapid succession). 
39. Deposition of Dr. John Doe at 20, Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 5, 
2006) (No. 05-4173) [hereinafter Doe Deposition]. 
40. See Henthorn Report supra note 20, ¶ 24. 
41. See, e.g., Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (“‘[W]e don’t have training, really.’”); 
Governor’s Comm’n on Admin. of Lethal Injection, Final Report with 
Findings and Recommendations 8 (2007) [hereinafter Florida Commission 
Report] (finding “[f]ailure of the training of the [Florida] execution team mem-
bers”); 11/27/2006 Am. Joint Pre-Hr’g Conf. Statement at 55, Morales (No. 06-
0219) (indicating that California team members had never read the protocol). 
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the doctor heading the procedure.42 Doerhoff turned out to be incompetent or 
callous, lowering the amount of the thiopental and making other changes to the 
procedure without consulting any Department of Corrections (DOC) authori-
ties.43 These actions belied Missouri’s public representations throughout litiga-
tion that it used five grams of thiopental during all executions.44 In reality, the 
DOC’s chemical log showed that Doerhoff sometimes prepared only 2.5 or 
fewer grams.45 When asked about the discrepancy, Doerhoff admitted that he 
was dyslexic and never knew how much thiopental he mixed.46 The log there-
fore represented only his very rough approximations.47  
Dyslexia was hardly Doerhoff’s only problem. His deposition revealed sev-
eral false assertions about a variety of medical issues, casting serious doubt on 
his professional competence.48 Additionally, Doerhoff’s surgical training gave 
him no background in the anesthesiological tasks crucial to the procedure.49 To 
 
42. Dr. Doerhoff’s identity was published several weeks after the trial by the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch. See Jeremy Kohler, Behind the Mask of the Mo. Execution Doctor, 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 29, 2006, at A-1. 
43. See Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006); Doe 
Deposition, supra note 39 at 96. 
44. See, e.g., Def. Crawford’s 9/12/2005 Answers to Plaintiff’s First Interrogatories 
at 8-9, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173; Defs’ 5/17/06 Letter to J. Gaitan at 1, 
Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173. 
45. Defs’ 5/17/06 Letter to J. Gaitan, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173 (apologizing for 
the State’s misstatements to the court about the thiopental dose). Successfully 
administering either 5 or 2.5 grams of thiopental would be sufficient to fully anes-
thetize an inmate for the duration of an execution. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487 
F.3d 1072, 1076 (8th Cir. 2007). Missouri’s careless approach to its doses neverthe-
less is troubling, because it demonstrates that the State does not follow its own 
procedures. Moreover, a 2.5 gram dose leaves less margin for error in the event of 
a leak, infiltration, or some other error. 
46. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (“John Doe I also testified that he felt that he 
had the authority to change or modify the formula as he saw fit. It is apparent that 
he has changed and modified the protocol on several occasions in the past.”); Doe 
Deposition, supra note 39, at 25 (“I am dyslexic and so . . . it’s not unusual for me 
to make mistakes.”). 
47. See Doe Deposition, supra note 39, at 25; Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *4-6 (dis-
cussing the Doerhoff deposition). 
48. See, e.g., Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (court indicating it was “gravely con-
cerned” about Doerhoff’s competence); Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 
29-57 (medical expert testifying that Doerhoff made several “100% backward,” 
“false,” and “very troubling” medical statements). 
49. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (noting that facility with numbers may not be 
necessary for surgery, but “is critical when one is mixing and dissolving chemicals 
for a lethal injection”); Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 29-43 (anesthesi-
ologist expert testifying that it is not “conceivable” than an anesthesiologist would 
make the mistakes Doerhoff made). 
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make matters worse, Missouri then lacked a written protocol, meaning that  
Doerhoff possessed “total discretion” for the procedure and that the whole 
team looked entirely to him for its responsibilities.50  
Unqualified personnel also create problems setting the intravenous (IV) 
catheter. If the catheter is improperly set, the drugs will not all be delivered suc-
cessfully into the vein. Instead, they will infiltrate, spilling into surrounding  
tissues. Infiltration itself is painful, but, even more alarming is the possibility 
that it will result in inadequate anesthesia. For example, during the Florida exe-
cution of Angel Diaz, inadequate anesthesia resulted in the inmate writhing and 
gasping on the gurney for thirty-four minutes before dying.51 An autopsy later 
revealed infiltration at his IV site.52 Placing the IV catheter can often be one of 
the procedure’s most difficult steps, especially because some condemned in-
mates are obese or former intravenous drug users, and yet, some states rely on 
unqualified personnel to perform this critical task.53  
Other problems result from the execution chambers’ architecture. To con-
ceal the identity of their executioners, many states place the inmate on a gurney 
in an execution chamber and staff in an adjacent execution support room 
where they are hidden from witnesses. After team members place the catheter in 
the inmate’s veins, they exit the room, leaving the inmate alone for the duration 
of the execution. The execution team then remotely administers the drugs, 
 
50. Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7-8. 
51. See Florida Commission Report, supra note 41, at 8; Phil Long & Marc Caputo, 
Lethal Injection Takes 34 Minutes To Kill Inmate, Miami Herald, Dec. 14, 2006, at 
5B. Diaz’s is not the only execution to have visible problems. See, e.g., Kevin Fa-
gan, The Execution of Stanley Tookie Williams, S.F. Chron., Dec. 14, 2005, at A12 
(noting that the execution took “36 agonizing minutes”). 
52. Mark J. Heath, Revisiting Physician Involvement in Capital Punishment, 83 Mayo 
Clinic Proc. 115, 116 (Jan. 2008) (“Diaz slowly died of the gradual absorption of 
infiltrated thiopental, pancuronium, and potassium. During a 34-minute interval, 
he gasped like a fish out of water.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  It is important to emphasize that because of the pancuronium, the absence of 
visible pain during other executions is no indication that those executions were 
problem free. For example, paralysis is possible even where infiltration results in 
inadequate anesthesia. Although the thiopental dose is usually more than neces-
sary to anesthetize the inmate, the overdoses of pancuronium are usually even lar-
ger. See, e.g., Atul Gawande, Better: A Surgeon’s Notes on Performance 
134 (2007). As a result, infiltration might result in too little thiopental for anesthe-
sia but enough pancuronium for paralysis and prolonged death by suffocation. 
53. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding that the 
State’s personnel are “not adequately prepared to deal with” complications associ-
ated with setting the IV line); Gawande, supra note 52, at 136, 146 (describing a 
state prison warden who claimed that he did not need medical personnel to assist 
with executions and that he would start the IVs himself, even though he had never 
started one before). 
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which travel in tubes from the support room through the wall into the execu-
tion chamber, up or down onto the gurney, and finally into the catheter.54  
The particulars of remote administration significantly heighten the risk of 
error that will lead to pain. For example, execution team members sometimes 
work in the dark to protect their identities. This precaution makes it harder for 
team members to identify which syringes contain which chemicals, therefore 
increasing the risk that they will administer them in the wrong order.55 Addi-
tionally, extra-long tubing is necessary to run from the plungers in the support 
room to the prisoner in the execution chamber. Such tubing can and has 
leaked, disconnected, or kinked.56 Furthermore, because such tubing generally 
runs through a hole in the wall, team members cannot see most of it and there-
fore will not know whether it has been compromised.57 Similarly, because a 
sheet usually covers the inmate, team members cannot see the catheter site and 
whether the IV has become dislodged.58 
Nor can the personnel tell whether the inmate has been sufficiently anes-
thetized before the second and third drugs are administered. Execution person-
nel often view the inmate through a window with partially drawn Venetian 
blinds. It is, therefore, “almost impossible” to observe the inmate’s anesthetic 
depth.59 Of course, even if the window afforded the execution team a better 
view of the inmate, judging anesthetic depth would be virtually impossible  
because anesthetic depth can only be measured competently at a patient’s elbow 
 
54. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 889 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (describing dif-
ficulties of remote administration); Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (identifying 
the challenges of remote administration). 
55. See Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 83 (expert anesthesiologist testifying 
that working in the dark is “ridiculous” and exacerbates the risk of complica-
tions). 
56. See id. at 78 (expert explaining that extra-long tubing is prone to more problems); 
Romanelli et al., supra note 21, at 1433; Heath Roane Decl., supra note 10, at 19 (ref-
erencing leaking IV lines in Maryland). 
57. See, e.g., Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (explaining that tubes go through holes 
in walls and that IV bags hang from hooks, but that the execution team cannot 
verify if the equipment is properly working); Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 
25, at 78 (expert explaining that the “full extent of the IV tubing [should be] com-
pletely visible and laid out in a neat fashion so that [the team] can clearly see that 
the conduit through which the drugs will flow is working properly”); Gawande et 
al., supra note 25, at 450. 
58. See Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (noting that the State’s expert conceded that 
sometimes catheters fail and that the IV site should therefore be monitored); Tay-
lor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 82 (explaining that the sheet covers the view 
of the catheter). 
59. Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8. “Anesthetic depth” refers to the plane of anesthe-
sia—that is, the degree to which a person is anesthetized. See supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
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by medical professionals with training in anesthesiology.60 Pancuronium-
induced paralysis further exacerbates these difficulties.  
Finally, some states have failed to adopt consistent, predictable procedures, 
leading to inconsistent behavior and recordkeeping.61 Poor recordkeeping, of 
course, makes it harder for the team to develop predictable patterns of behav-
ior. That haphazardness, in turn, can create deviations from the standard pro-
cedure, make errors more likely, and render it harder to learn from past errors. 
And even if the team somehow were to discover problems, some states have no 
contingency plans to deal with them.62  
Of course, current procedures do further certain goals. They protect the 
executioners’ anonymity (e.g., the remote administration) and show the wit-
nesses a serene execution (e.g., the pancuronium). The inmate’s pain, though, is 
a background issue to which many states have given only minimal thought.  
Federal courts in California, Missouri, and Tennessee have found serious 
flaws with their states’ lethal injection procedures and required changes.63 More 
often, courts have granted minimal or no relief, despite some or many of the 
aforementioned problems.64 Still others have entered stays to learn more about 
apparently problematic procedures only to be reversed on other grounds.65  
Litigation is still pending elsewhere.66  
 
60. See, e.g., Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 71 (expert anesthesiologist ex-
plaining that anesthesiologists monitoring anesthetic depth during executions 
must “be physically in contact with the patient, standing right by their head and 
able to test various reflexes” and that because the Missouri doctor observed only 
through a window from an adjacent room and lacked important equipment, he 
could not “make any meaningful determination of anesthetic depth”); Dershwitz 
& Henthorn, supra note 19, at 949. 
61. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *3 (noting that Missouri was still trying to under-
stand error in its own recordkeeping); Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (describ-
ing California’s erratic recordkeeping). 
62. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *9 (ordering that Missouri put in place contin-
gency plans in case problems develop during an execution); Heath Roane Decl., 
supra note 10, at 25 (explaining that federal protocol “made no provisions whatso-
ever for the foreseeable contingency of IV access failure”). 
63. See Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 903; Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *9; Morales II, 465 
F. Supp. 2d at 978-84. The Missouri decision was subsequently reversed on appeal, 
and the case was subsequently dismissed on remand. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487 
F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 07-4129, slip op. at 4-5 
(W.D. Mo. July 15, 2008). 
64. See, e.g., Brown v. Beck, No. 06-3018, slip op. at 6-7 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 17, 2006), aff’d 
445 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 2006) (permitting state to proceed with executions with 
minimal revision); Emmett v. Johnson, 511 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Va. 2007) (grant-
ing state’s motion for summary judgment), aff’d, 532 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2008); 
State v. Schwab, 995 So. 2d 922, 932 (Fla. 2008) (upholding Florida’s procedure). 
65. See Boltz v. Jones, 182 Fed. App. 824, 825 (10th Cir. 2006) (vacating a stay issued by 
the Oklahoma district court due in part to the “State’s interest in the timely effec-
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B. The Supreme Court’s Fractured Decision in Baze v. Rees 
 
The outcomes of these pending cases will depend in part on how courts in-
terpret the United States Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Baze v. Rees.67 Baze 
was the Supreme Court’s first case directly addressing the constitutionality of a 
state’s lethal injection procedure. The Court had already held in Nelson v. 
Campbell and Hill v. McDonough that death row inmates could bring an action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge a state’s execution procedures and that such 
actions were not subject to habeas corpus’s more rigorous procedural gatekeep-
ing requirements.68 But Baze was the Court’s first foray into the Eighth 
Amendment legal standard governing lethal injection cases. 
Baze considered the constitutionality of Kentucky’s version of the three-
drug protocol. Litigation in Kentucky had not revealed systemic problems of 
the sort discovered in Missouri, California, and Tennessee. Kentucky, in fact, 
had conducted only one execution by lethal injection, so the record was 
sparse.69 Moreover, the plaintiff received incomplete discovery, so there was no 
 
tuation of its final criminal judgments”); McNair v. Allen, 06-695, 2007 WL 
4463489, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 14, 2007) (noting “substantial but disputed evi-
dence” that Alabama’s protocol contains “constitutional deficiencies in the moni-
toring of the procedure, the training of certain participants, and the use of poten-
tially unconstitutionally painful drugs” and staying the execution), rev’d, 515 F.3d 
1168, 1172 (11th Cir. 2008) (vacating the stay on statute of limitations grounds). 
66. See, e.g., Jones v. Bradshaw, No. 07-3766 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2009) (order remanding 
case back to Ohio district court for discovery); Plaintiffs’ Surreply, Roane v. Gon-
zales, No. 05-2337 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2008) (arguing that court should resolve case 
on merits after full discovery); Motion for Summary Judgment, Dickens v. Na-
politano, No. 07-1770 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2009). 
67. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). 
68. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), “second or 
successive” habeas petitions must be dismissed, except in narrow circumstances. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hill and Nelson, 
some lower courts had dismissed lethal injection claims by treating them as “suc-
cessive” habeas petitions, even though they had been filed as § 1983 actions. See, 
e.g., Hill v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1084, 1085 (11th Cir. 2006) (“It is clear to us that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant’s [lethal injection] claim 
because it is the functional equivalent of a successive habeas petition and he failed 
to obtain leave of this court to file it.”), rev’d sub nom. Hill v. McDonough, 547 
U.S. 573 (2006). The Supreme Court made clear in Hill that because a lethal injec-
tion claim does “not challenge the lethal injection sentence as a general matter but 
seeks instead only to enjoin the respondents from executing [plaintiff] in the 
manner they currently intend,” it can be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is 
therefore exempt from AEDPA’s stringent gatekeeping provisions. Hill, 547 U.S. at 
580 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 
647 (2004). 
69. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1528. 
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evidence that Kentucky had ever had any problems with its procedure.70 There 
was no smoking gun—no equivalent of Missouri’s dyslexic doctor or Florida’s 
writhing inmate—and, in fact, little evidence at all. The limited record did indi-
cate that Kentucky takes precautionary measures absent in other states, such as 
using a phlebotomist to insert the catheters, thus decreasing the risk of infiltra-
tion.71 Kentucky also requires wardens to remain in the execution chamber with 
the prisoner to watch for IV problems, including infiltration.72 Additionally, it 
requires its team to participate in at least ten practice sessions a year.73 In short, 
in comparison to other states, the Kentucky record was decidedly clean.74 
The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the procedure was extremely 
fractured; seven different Justices wrote opinions, and no single opinion gar-
nered more than three votes. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion, 
which was joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito. In upholding the Kentucky 
procedure, the plurality tried to clarify the Eighth Amendment standard for 
method-of-execution claims. It required the plaintiff to establish both (1) that 
the current lethal injection procedure poses “a substantial risk of serious 
harm”75 and (2) that the state has refused to adopt a “feasible, readily  
implemented” alternative “significantly” reducing that risk.76 The plurality, 
thus, agreed with petitioners that the availability of a safer procedure was con-
stitutionally relevant but emphasized that “a condemned prisoner cannot suc-
 
70. For example, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were unable to depose the executioners. See 
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16, Baze (No. 07-5439). Despite this limited record, 
the plaintiff represented in his petition for certiorari that the record was, in fact, 
uniquely complete in comparison to other lethal injection cases. See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 24, Baze (No. 07-5439) (“[T]his case presents the most suc-
cinct and complete record for this Court to address the important legal issues 
raised by challenges [to lethal injection.]”). 
71. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533-34. A phlebotomist is an individual trained to draw blood 
and insert catheters into veins. At oral argument, the State contended that this 
phlebotomist “is probably literally the best qualified human being in the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky to place the IV line.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, 
Baze (No. 07-5439). 
72. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534. 
73. Id. 
74. See id. at 1542 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the question of whether the 
three-drug protocol can be practiced in other states could be answered differently 
in a state with a “more complete record”); id. at 1566 (Breyer, J., concurring) (in-
dicating that the record in Kentucky provided “too little reason” to believe that 
additional safeguards were necessary); id. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (favor-
ing remand for additional factfinding). 
75. Id. at 1531 (plurality opinion) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 
(1994)). 
76. Id. at 1532. 
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cessfully challenge a State’s method of execution merely by showing a slightly or 
marginally safer alternative.”77 Instead: 
the alternative procedure must be feasible, readily implemented, and in 
fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. If a State re-
fuses to adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented ad-
vantages, without a legitimate penological justification for adhering to 
its current method of execution, then a State’s refusal to change its 
method can be viewed as “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth 
Amendment.78 
An inmate challenging a method of execution, then, must demonstrate both the 
shortcomings of the state’s existing procedures and the relative merits of an  
alternative.  
The Kentucky plaintiffs failed to make either showing. Whereas plaintiffs in 
other states had uncovered problems that greatly heightened the risk that thio-
pental delivery would be compromised, the plaintiffs in Kentucky presented no 
such evidence. Indeed, they were not even permitted to depose the execution 
personnel, a denial of discovery that made it difficult to gather evidence about 
the true nature of the Kentucky procedure.79 Instead of evidence about how the 
procedure was carried out in practice, the Kentucky record included mostly  
details about the written protocol, which demonstrated that Kentucky had 
adopted particular safeguards to ensure successful thiopental delivery. The 
three-Justice plurality, therefore, rejected petitioners’ argument that they might 
not receive an adequate dose of thiopental.80  
Nor did the Kentucky plaintiffs convince the Court that the use of  
pancuronium bromide to paralyze the inmates was itself problematic. Even 
though pancuronium makes it almost impossible to tell whether an inmate has 
been properly anesthetized (particularly given that laypeople often monitor  
anesthetic depth), the plurality concluded that the pancuronium prevented in-
voluntary physical movements, and that the state “has an interest in preserving 
the dignity of the procedure, especially where convulsions or seizures could be 
misperceived as signs of consciousness or distress.”81  
 
77. Id. at 1531. 
78. Id. at 1532. 
79. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 16 n.2, Baze (No. 07-5439) (arguing that trial court’s 
denial of depositions was “inexplicable”). 
80. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533-34 (plurality opinion). 
81. Id. at 1535. The plurality also argued that Kentucky’s continued use of the three-
drug protocol could not be seen as posing an “‘objectively intolerable risk’ when 
no other State has adopted the one-drug method.” Id. at 1535; see also id. at 1532 
(noting that “it is difficult to regard a practice as ‘objectively intolerable’ when it is 
in fact widely tolerated”). It is not clear why a widespread practice should be con-
sidered presumptively valid, since a method of execution can cause excruciating 
pain but still be widespread. To be sure, a widespread practice might not be “un-
usual,” but the Eighth Amendment surely does not permit excruciating execution 
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Significantly, the Kentucky plaintiffs also had failed to present to the trial 
court evidence about an alternative protocol. This failure left the Supreme 
Court “without any findings on the effectiveness of petitioners’ barbiturate-
only protocol.”82 Given the plurality’s explicitly comparative approach—that is, 
given that the lethal injection plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a “fea-
sible, readily implemented” alternative procedure that “in fact significantly  
reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain”83—the absence of findings demon-
strating the superiority of the one-drug protocol or another alternative neces-
sarily doomed the Kentucky plaintiffs.  
As for future plaintiffs in different states with different evidence, Baze 
leaves the door open for lethal injection challenges alleging that a state has  
refused to change its method of execution notwithstanding a feasible, readily 
implemented, significantly safer alternative procedure.84 The Justices, however, 
disagreed about just how open the door remains. Chief Justice Roberts wrote 
that an inmate “must show that the risk [of severe pain] is substantial when 
compared to the known and available alternatives. A State with a lethal injec-
tion protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold today would not 
create a risk that meets this standard.”85 One question in future cases, then, will 
be whether a given state’s procedure is “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s.86  
 
procedures so long as they are widespread. Reliance on the fact that a procedure is 
“widely tolerated” then unduly tempts courts to ignore the major political process 
failures that have caused flawed procedures to become widespread in the first 
place. See infra Part III. 
82. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534 (plurality opinion). The plurality also noted that Tennessee 
had rejected a proposal to adopt a one-drug protocol, thus demonstrating that the 
“comparative efficacy of a one-drug method of execution is not so well estab-
lished.” Id. at 1535. Whether misinformed or disingenuous, this argument misses 
the mark, because a single Tennessee bureaucrat rejected the recommendation of 
a one-drug protocol presented by a committee charged with re-evaluating the 
State’s lethal injection policy. See infra notes 265-270 and accompanying text. 
83. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 1537 (emphasis added). 
86. Another reading of the plurality’s “substantially similar” language is that it refers 
only to the standard needed to obtain a stay. See id. at 1537 (explaining that “[a] 
stay of execution may not be granted on grounds such as those asserted here 
unless the condemned prisoner establishes that the State’s lethal injection proto-
col creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain” and, adding two sentences later, 
that a “substantially similar” protocol would not meet this standard). Under this 
reading, a court only need inquire whether a given state’s procedure is “substan-
tially similar” to Kentucky’s if the inmate plaintiff would need a stay of execution 
for his litigation to continue. 
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The plurality suggests that Baze resolves many challenges.87 But it is  
virtually impossible to know before discovery whether another state’s proce-
dures are “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s. It is true that at least thirty states 
use the same three drugs Kentucky does.88 Two execution procedures, though, 
can hardly be deemed “substantially similar” merely because they use the same 
drugs.89 As litigation has demonstrated, the procedure’s safety hinges on how 
the drugs are administered. And while a state’s written protocol can lend some 
insight into that state’s practices, some states do not follow their own written 
protocols. Kentucky’s procedure was easy to uphold, because there was minimal 
evidence about how Kentucky’s procedures actually worked. “Only one  
Kentucky prisoner . . . has been executed since the Commonwealth adopted  
lethal injection,” and there were “no reported problems” at that execution.90 By 
way of contrast, serious problems have been documented in other states.  
Given that the safety of a method of execution depends not just on the four 
corners of the written protocol but on the details of administration, a state’s 
procedure could not be deemed “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s without 
discovery into that state’s actual practices—the training and qualifications of its 
execution team, the suitability of the equipment, the architecture of the execu-
tion facilities, and so on. In other words, the “substantially similar” inquiry is 
necessarily a question of fact and, like all questions of fact, cannot be answered 
without fact-finding. Indeed, given states’ efforts to conceal the details of their 
procedure, discovery in lethal injection cases often requires particularly atten-
tive judicial supervision.91  
Whether Baze will, in fact, be interpreted this way is less certain. Justice 
Alito’s concurrence emphasized that the plurality had erected a high hurdle for 
these claims and contended that Justices Stevens and Thomas were incorrect in 
 
87. See id. at 1537 (plurality opinion) (arguing that the plurality decision “resolves 
more challenges than [Justice Stevens] acknowledges”); id. at 1542 (Alito, J., con-
curring). 
88. Id. at 1527 n.1. 
89. See Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 311 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., dissenting) 
(“Merely using identical drugs, but in varying amounts and at varying times in the 
procedure, hardly yields ‘largely identical’ lethal injection protocols.”). 
90. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1528 (plurality opinion). 
91. See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that 
California had not fulfilled its discovery obligations despite court orders to do so); 
Oken v. Sizer, 321 F. Supp. 2d 658, 663 (D. Md. 2004) (noting that the State’s re-
fusal to disclose execution protocol denied plaintiff a “minimal hearing”); Denno, 
Quandary, supra note 28, at 95 (explaining that “states never have been forthcom-
ing about how they perform lethal injections” and adding that some states re-
cently have retreated into “greater secrecy”). 
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perceiving that the decision would lead to substantial litigation.92 Emphasizing 
that the opinion must be read so as to avoid “litigation gridlock” and “a grave 
danger of extended delay,”93 Justice Alito would have set an especially low bar 
for finding another state’s procedure “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s. Jus-
tice Stevens’s concurrence disagreed, arguing that “[t]he question whether a 
similar three-drug protocol may be used in other States remains open, and may 
well be answered differently in a future case on the basis of a more complete  
record.”94 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,95 agreed with Justice Stevens 
that more litigation was certain to follow,96 but, relying on his interpretation of 
the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment, would have found a con-
stitutional violation only if the method of execution “is deliberately designed to 
inflict pain.”97  
The three remaining Justices—Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—all agreed on 
yet another Eighth Amendment standard: “whether the method creates an  
untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary suffer-
ing.”98 This standard would consider three interrelated factors—the degree of 
 
92. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1538 (Alito, J., concurring). Of course, it is notable that the Chief 
Justice did not feel compelled to incorporate Justice Alito’s concerns into the plu-
rality opinion. 
93. Id. at 1542 (Alito, J., concurring). 
94. Id. at 1542 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens’s concurrence received signifi-
cant attention, because even though he voted to uphold the Kentucky procedure, 
he also announced his conclusion that “the death penalty represents the ‘pointless 
and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible 
social or public purposes.’” Id. at 1551 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). 
95. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote his own dissent objecting to 
Justice Stevens’s views about the death penalty more generally. See id. at 1552-56 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
96. Id. at 1563 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the plurality standard as “un-
workable”). 
97. Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring). Because of the attention to “evolving stan-
dards of decency,” history informs Eighth Amendment doctrine less than it does 
other constitutional areas. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (stat-
ing that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”) (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Consequently, a method of execution that was 
once acceptable might be unconstitutional today, either because new evidence 
demonstrates that it creates a previously unknown unacceptable risk of excruciat-
ing pain or because new values reject that kind of punishment as inhumane. Jus-
tice Thomas’s reliance on history, while consistent with interpretation of other 
constitutional provisions, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 
(2008), is therefore mostly anomalous in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
98. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 1572 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of alternatives. “[A] strong showing on 
one reduces the importance of the others.”99 However, whereas Justice Breyer 
could not find “sufficient evidence that Kentucky’s execution method poses” an 
unconstitutional risk of severe pain,100 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice 
Souter, would have vacated and remanded for further fact-finding.101 
Because Baze relied on an incomplete record and resulted in seven different 
opinions, it is difficult to know what the law is.102 It is true that “[w]hen a frag-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys 
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that  
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the nar-
rowest grounds.’”103 Even to the extent, though, that the three-Justice plurality’s  
opinion may be viewed as the holding, it offers incomplete clarification. For  
instance, the plurality, citing a prison health case, stated that to amount to an 
Eighth Amendment violation, “the conditions presenting the risk [of pain] 
must be ‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,’ and 
give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’”104 This articulation appears to set 
an extremely high standard for a violation. Taken in isolation, this sentence im-
plies that an execution procedure that more likely than not caused excruciating 
pain would not violate the Eighth Amendment unless pain were “very likely.” 
Although courts have never quantified Eighth Amendment risk, this passage 
 
99. Id. at 1568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring). By 
way of contrast, the plurality appears to have put particular weight on the degree 
of risk. See id. at 1532 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he proffered alternatives must effec-
tively address a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 842 (1994))). 
100. Id. at 1563-64 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
101. Id. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
102. It is also difficult to know why the Court granted certiorari at all. One explanation 
is that the Court took Mr. Baze’s attorneys at their word when they claimed to 
have a complete record and granted certiorari before examining the record care-
fully. See supra note 70. Another theory is that Baze was an unfriendly grant, in 
which four pro-death penalty Justices deliberately selected a case with an unde-
veloped record, because such a case would make it easier to uphold the procedure 
and articulate a stricter legal standard. This theory is further bolstered by the fact 
that when the Court granted certiorari in Baze, it also had before it a petition for 
certiorari from the Eighth Circuit in Taylor. Notwithstanding the Eighth Circuit’s 
reversal of the district court and Mr. Baze’s claims to the contrary, Taylor unques-
tionably presented more evidence suggesting an Eighth Amendment violation. See 
supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text. 
103. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). 
104. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (plurality opinion) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 
25, 33 (1993)). Baze’s reliance on Helling is surprising, because courts typically treat 
method-of-execution and prison conditions challenges as separate doctrinal lines. 
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would seem to say that 95% chance of pain would amount to a constitutional 
violation, but 51% chance of pain would not.  
Yet it is almost impossible to believe that five Justices on the Court would 
consciously approve a procedure they know causes excruciating pain more than 
half the time. Indeed, Helling v. McKinney, the case upon with the plurality re-
lied to offer such a suggestion, held that a prisoner states a viable cause of action 
under the Eighth Amendment by alleging exposure to health risks (such as sec-
ondary smoke) that very well may never result in illness or pain.105 Helling, then, 
does not seem to stand for the proposition that conditions need to be “sure or 
very likely” to cause suffering to trigger an Eighth Amendment violation. More-
over, the plurality’s further discussion suggests that it was not thinking in these 
terms, for, later on, it announced that a state violates the Eighth Amendment if 
it refuses to adopt an alternative procedure that “significantly reduce[s] a  
substantial risk of severe pain.”106 Phrased this way, the standard seems to focus 
less on the original procedure’s degree of risk and more on whether the alterna-
tive would significantly reduce that risk, so long as that initial risk is itself  
“substantial.” But “substantial” is a mushy word, so this language might well 
allow the finding of a violation for a state that refuses to switch from a proce-
dure creating, for example, a 20% risk of pain to a procedure that would lower 
that risk of pain to 1%.107 In short, this muddle does little to provide guidance to 
lower courts.  
 
II. Remedial Anxieties and Lethal Injection 
 
A. How Remedy Constrains the Right 
 
Generally speaking, courts before and after Baze have been reluctant to en-
gage with lethal injection issues. In rejecting these claims, judges often employ 
the kind of rhetoric commonly used to criticize the imposition of constitutional 
remedies, sounding in themes of judicial restraint, federalism, and separation of 
powers. Many lower courts never reach the remedial issue as a formal matter, 
because they decline to find a violation at all. But although courts are imprecise 
about exactly how and why remedial concerns should limit the Eighth Amend-
ment right, the problem of what remedy to impose nonetheless significantly 
 
105. Helling, 509 U.S. at 33. It is also worth noting that prison health cases require a 
finding of deliberate indifference not required in method-of-execution challenges. 
Compare id. at 33 (requiring deliberate indifference in a prison health challenge), 
with Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1525-38 (not requiring a finding of deliberate indifference). 
106. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107. Of course, it is impossible to quantify precisely the risk of pain in these cases, but 
such a discussion helps identify ambiguities and inconsistencies in the plurality’s 
approach. 
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colors these courts’ rulings.108 Courts, thus, move the focus from the right-
holder—the plaintiff whose rights have been allegedly violated—to the  
defendant against whom the remedy would be imposed.109  
It is worth noting that some attention to potential alternatives is justifiable. 
After all, the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punish-
ment”110 implicitly asks if the practice at issue creates a significant risk of pain 
compared to available alternatives.111 An Eighth Amendment standard premised 
on unnecessary risk of pain must consider, then, whether a different method 
could plausibly remove that risk. If not, the risk might be necessary.  
That being said, painless methods of execution do exist,112 so the remedial 
inquiry should rarely be dispositive in cases in which the plaintiff has demon-
strated a real risk of pain.113 Courts, however, typically have not thought 
through precisely what role the remedial inquiry plays in the larger Eighth 
Amendment analysis. To the contrary, many courts have failed to explore in de-
tail the relative merits of different methods of execution. Instead, they have of-
ten sidestepped that important question to assert the danger of any judicially  
imposed remedy, regardless of the details.114  
It is odd to think that the possibility of any judicially imposed remedy 
should dispositively militate against finding an Eighth Amendment violation. 
As a formal matter, the primary focus at the rights stage should be (and prior to 
Baze often was) whether the execution procedure subjects the inmate to a sig-
nificant or unnecessary risk of excruciating pain.115 Courts’ remedial inquiry, 
 
108. Of course, remedies are not the only factor driving courts’ behavior here, but they 
are significant and overlooked in the scholarship. 
109. See Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Meaning of 
Unitary Status, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 283, 323-24 (2002) (arguing that the remedial ques-
tion changes depending on whether the court focuses on the plaintiff’s rights or 
steps the defendant has taken to comply with its legal duty). 
110. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
111. See, e.g., Timothy K. Kuhner, The Foreign Source Doctrine: Expanding the Role of 
Foreign and International Law in Interpreting the Constitution, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
1389, 1412 (2007) (“‘Cruel and unusual’ is a comparative phrase” begging the ques-
tion “‘cruel and unusual compared to what?’”). 
112. See infra Subsection IV.A.1. 
113. The exception might be a case in which the plaintiff has refused to proffer an al-
ternative. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
114. See infra Section IV.A (arguing that courts have incorrectly assumed that any 
remedy would necessarily be onerous, intrusive, and therefore inappropriate); 
Subsections II.A.1, II.A.2 (arguing that courts have used remedial concerns to 
avoid engaging with the details of the challenged procedures, even when con-
fronted with evidence of the procedures’ dangers). 
115. See, e.g., Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment protects against “an unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain 
and suffering”); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
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then, has changed the very nature of the right, distracting attention away from 
the question of whether the existing method of execution is potentially  
painful.116  
In a seminal article, Professor Levinson explains how undesirable remedial 
consequences can prompt courts to limit or extinguish rights to avoid those 
consequences.117 Constitutional rights, Levinson explains, “are inevitably shaped 
by, and incorporate, remedial concerns.”118 Rights are dependent on remedies 
not just for their real world application, but for their scope and “very  
existence.”119 Thus, as Professor Gewirtz explains, “[t]he prospect of actualizing 
 
(same); Evans v. Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (D. Md. 2006) (same); Fernando J. 
Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation of the Death Penalty, 35 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 763, 784 (2008) (“The person who we must be concerned 
about in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is the condemned.”). This focus on 
the right possessor’s pain also makes sense given that the Eighth Amendment in 
the method-of-execution context is almost always thought to confer an individual 
right, rather than a structural protection. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of 
Rights 104-08 (1998) (suggesting that a jury right might not be an individual 
right but rather a structural provision). 
116. It is true that constitutional inquiries sometimes balance state interests against the 
asserted right. In the Fourth Amendment context, for instance, courts seek to bal-
ance the right of privacy against the need for law enforcement and safety. See, e.g., 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (allowing an exception to the exclusionary rule 
for a revolver found during a reasonable search of the suspect). Such constitu-
tional balancing, though, may only encroach so far on a constitutional right’s 
core. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (explain-
ing that even though constitutional rights are not absolute, the Second Amend-
ment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”). In the Eighth Amendment 
method-of-execution context, that core protects the inmate against excruciating 
pain and should be protected in the absence of overwhelming contrary interests. 
117. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. 
Rev. 857, 885 (1999) (arguing that “the threat of undesirable remedial conse-
quences [can] motivat[e] courts to construct the right in such a way as to avoid 
those consequences”). 
118. Id. at 873. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Con-
stitutional Meaning, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1274, 1314-17 (2006) (arguing that Levin-
son’s “pragmatic” model is “unduly reductionist” and that the “pragmatist must 
deny the possibility of right answers to constitutional questions”). 
119. Levinson, supra note 117, at 858. Levinson calls this phenomenon “remedial 
equilibration.” Id. at 884-85. He explains that remedial equilibration usually in-
volves the redefinition of rights and remedies “in an iterated process” in which a 
series of cases gradually hash out the appropriate remedy for the violation of a 
constitutional right. Id. at 874. In this way, the right itself is redefined. Id. at 873-
74. Lethal injection challenges typically do not spawn this kind of a series of cases, 
but, at a more basic level, Levinson’s insights still highlight the extent to which 
courts shape the content of a constitutional right in response to remedial anxie-
ties. 
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rights through a remedy—the recognition that rights are for actual people in an 
actual world—makes it inevitable that thoughts of remedy will affect thoughts 
of right, that judges’ minds will shuttle back and forth between right and  
remedy.”120 In other words, remedial concerns shape constitutional rights even 
if courts, as a formal matter, are not reaching the remedial inquiry and are  
making false assumptions about the remedial issues.  
 
1. Remedial Concerns in Baze 
 
In articulating a stringent Eighth Amendment standard, the Supreme Court 
in Baze relied heavily on arguments about the remedy. The second prong of the 
plurality’s standard required the plaintiff to show the existence of a “feasible, 
readily implemented” remedy that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk 
of severe pain.”121 The right, in other words, explicitly incorporates a remedial 
inquiry.  
Given that the Eighth Amendment’s words “cruel” and “unusual” seem to 
invite this kind of comparative examination,122 the plurality’s mention of alter-
native methods is unsurprising and appropriate.123 What is more noteworthy, 
however, is how the Chief Justice addressed the remedial issues. Given the gaps 
in the record and particular safeguards adopted by Kentucky, the plurality easily 
concluded that “the risks identified by petitioners are [not] so substantial or 
imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.”124 Having found 
that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the first “substantial risk” prong of the stan-
dard, the plurality could have ended the case or merely articulated the second 
prong—the showing of a significantly better alternative. But not only did the 
plurality require this second prong, it explained at length why a rigorous reme-
dial showing was essential. Specifically, the plurality argued that the finding of 
“an Eighth Amendment violation” without the showing of a significantly better 
alternative procedure “would threaten to transform courts into boards of  
inquiry charged with determining ‘best practices’ for executions, with each rul-
 
120. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 679 (1983). 
121. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 75-78 
and accompanying text (summarizing the plurality’s two-prong standard). 
122. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text. 
123. In addition to implementing the Eighth Amendment’s comparative inquiry, the 
plurality’s requirement that the plaintiff proffer an alternative method also guards 
against disingenuous plaintiffs who challenge the current method with every in-
tention of challenging any replacement method, no matter how safe. It is appro-
priate for courts to guard against such disingenuous litigation. However, to the 
extent these concerns seem to drive the plurality’s approach, the plurality seems 
not to trust lower courts’ abilities to distinguish between genuine actions chal-
lenging dangerous procedures from disingenuous ones challenging safe proce-
dures. See infra notes 195-196 and accompanying text. 
124. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534 (plurality opinion). 
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ing supplanted by another round of litigation touting a new and improved 
methodology.”125  
The plurality thus tied the Eighth Amendment standard to remedial issues 
in different ways. First, the plurality insisted that the plaintiff must proffer an 
alternative method of execution that is more than “slightly or marginally safer” 
than the current method.126 It then rejected the Kentucky plaintiffs’ suit,  
because their affirmative case lacked that remedial presentation.127 Regardless of 
the safety of the Kentucky procedure, then, the plaintiffs would have lost for 
failing to present a remedial showing that, prior to Baze, had not been clearly 
required. The plaintiffs, however, had suggested alternative approaches in the 
proceedings below and had extensively developed the one-drug protocol’s  
advantages in their Supreme Court brief.128 The plurality ignored the one-drug 
proposal, finding that it had not been adequately developed in the lower 
courts.129 It is understandable that the plurality did not want to adopt a remedy 
on which there were only limited trial court findings, but it then proceeded to 
denigrate that same remedy’s viability.130 It thus made it harder for future plain-
tiffs to propose that remedy. In other words, the plurality used the absence of 
trial court factual findings on the plaintiff’s proposed remedy to dismiss the 
claim on the merits. It then sought to discredit that same remedial proposal, de-
spite the inadequacy of the record below and extensive expert testimony in 
other cases that its advantages are significant.131  
Second, the plurality warned that finding for plaintiff would force courts to 
issue a remedy requiring that the state replace its old method with the safest 
method available—that is, with the “best practice.”132 In other words, the plural-
 
125. Id. at 1531. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1534. 
128. See Petitioners’ Brief at 51-57, Baze 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439) (explaining the 
merits of the one-drug protocol). 
129. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534-35 & n.4. 
130. See id. at 1535-36 (raising concerns about one-drug alternative); id. at 1538 (con-
cluding with the observation that the one-drug alternative “has problems of its 
own”). But see infra Subsection IV.A.1 (explaining why the one-drug protocol re-
mains viable after Baze). 
131. See infra note 286 and accompanying text. The point is not that the plurality 
should have drawn different conclusions about the one-drug protocol, but that it 
should not have suggested that it had “problems of its own,” given the absence of 
“any findings” about it. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534, 1538. A more appropriate dis-
position would have been either to dispose of the case without the lengthy reme-
dial inquiry or to remand for further factfinding, especially given that the plaintiff 
prior to Baze did not know that the Eighth Amendment standard required a re-
medial showing as part of the affirmative case. See id. at 1572 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (“I would therefore remand.”). 
132. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (plurality opinion). 
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ity feared that whenever a court struck down a lethal injection procedure, it 
would have had to “intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing” 
the safest possible replacement procedure.133 To drive home the point, the Chief 
Justice cited Bell v. Wolfish, in which the Court reversed a structural injunction 
in a prison conditions case, thus reiterating that the “wide range of ‘judgment 
calls’ that meet constitutional and statutory requirements are confided to offi-
cials outside of the Judicial Branch of Government.”134 The plurality, therefore, 
emphasized that executive and legislative officials, not judges, should design 
states’ lethal injection procedures. Allowing lower courts to require the state to 
adopt the “best practice” (and then allowing them to do so repeatedly, as the 
“best practice” changed) would shift too much authority from the political 
branches to the judiciary.  
Here the plurality once again contracted the Eighth Amendment right by 
drawing false assumptions about remedial issues. Contrary to the plurality’s  
arguments, the finding that a lethal injection procedure created a significant or 
unnecessary risk of pain would not require the state to institute the “best prac-
tice.” Of course, the “best practice” alternative would be one remedial option, 
but a court could also require that the state merely find a better, rather than the 
best, practice.135 The district court recognized this possibility in Morales when it 
offered the state two remedial options.136 The court did not care which remedy 
was best because both would have significantly reduced the risks posed by the 
status quo and almost certainly resulted in painless executions. Thus, even if a 
court decided that the risks of the three-drug protocol amounted to a constitu-
tional violation, that court, even before Baze, need not have required the “best 
practice.” For example, if another alternative would significantly reduce the risk 
of pain (but not by as much as the best practice), a court may well be justified in 
requiring that other alternative, particularly if it were comparatively inexpen-
sive, unintrusive, and easy to implement. Similarly, courts could issue a  
negative injunction allowing a state to craft its own remedy.137 In fact, contrary 
to the plurality’s representations, the petitioners never argued that they were 
entitled to a “best practice” remedy.138 Instead, they merely contended that the 
one-drug alternative was readily available and significantly preferable to the 
three-drug approach.139  
 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1531-32 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)). 
135. See infra Section IV.A. 
136. See Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
137. See infra Subsection IV.A.2. 
138. See generally Petitioners’ Brief at 51-59, Baze (No. 07-5439) (arguing that the adop-
tion of “available alternatives” could reasonably prevent the risk of pain). 
139. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 19, Baze (No. 07-5439) (contending that a prop-
erly administered single dose of a barbiturate is “both lethal and far less dangerous 
than the three-drug” protocol). 
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Relatedly, the three-Justice plurality also emphasized that the “best  
practices” remedy would “embroil the courts in ongoing scientific controversies 
beyond their expertise,” thus “substantially intrud[ing] on the role of state  
legislatures in implementing their execution procedures.”140 These contentions 
are misplaced because the political branches have demonstrated no scientific 
understanding that courts lack and because many state legislatures have played 
virtually no role in designing execution procedures.141 It is worth emphasizing 
here that these arguments suggest that courts lack the institutional competence 
to consider a remedy at all. Concluding that it would be “substantially” intru-
sive for courts to entertain such remedial issues, the plurality then reasoned 
backwards that the Eighth Amendment standards proposed by the petitioner 
and dissent were improper and that a narrower legal standard was preferable.142 
In reality, neither the petitioner’s nor the dissent’s standards would have “sub-
stantially intrude[d] on the role of state legislatures”143 or required courts to 
impose a “best practice.”144  
What is perhaps most striking about the plurality’s approach is that this ar-
ticulation of a difficult legal standard was unnecessary to the resolution of Baze 
itself. Baze was an easy case on the merits. Nevertheless, driven by its concern 
that courts in other cases not become “best-practices” boards of inquiry, the 
plurality chose not merely to affirm the lower court on the case’s limited record 
but also to articulate a legal standard that raised the bar for future lethal injec-
tion plaintiffs. By going further than it needed to in deciding this case, the plu-
rality highlighted the extent to which it was uncomfortable with any court in-
truding on states’ prerogatives to design their own procedures. 
 
2. Remedial Concerns in Other Lethal Injection Cases 
 
Lower courts addressing these issues pre-Baze also allow a distorted view of 
the remedial issues to shape their approaches to the cases. This approach is 
most justifiable when a court actually finds serious problems with a procedure 
and therefore engages in a direct discussion of potential remedies. After all, 
courts imposing remedies on states ought to consider the impact those  
remedies will have and whether they might create new problems. The Northern 
District of California explored remedial issues in two different opinions in the 
 
140. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (plurality opinion). 
141. See infra Section IV.B. 
142. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531-32 (plurality opinion) (“Accordingly, we reject petition-
ers’ proposed ‘unnecessary risk’ standard, as well as the dissent’s ‘untoward’ risk 
variation.”); supra Section I.B (discussing the Baze plurality’s standard). 
143. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (plurality opinion). 
144. See id. at 1569 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality that proof of a 
slightly safer alternative is insufficient and arguing that the standard should ask 
whether “readily available measures can materially” reduce the risk of pain); infra 
Part IV. 
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Morales case. Both times it warned against judicial encroachment and indicated 
that the dangers of the procedure could be addressed without placing an undue 
burden on the state. In his first order, Judge Fogel permitted California to pro-
ceed with its execution of Michael Morales provided that it either execute him 
with a dose of a single barbiturate or agree to allow a trained medical profes-
sional in anesthesiology to monitor the inmate’s consciousness before the  
delivery of the pancuronium and potassium chloride.145 California chose the lat-
ter option and secured the participation of two anesthesiologists.146  
Even as he required the state to change its practices, Judge Fogel took great 
pains to find a solution that would “place a substantially lesser burden on the 
State’s strong interest in proceeding” with the execution.147 Indeed, the district 
court explained that “under the doctrines of comity and separation of powers, 
the particulars of California’s lethal-injection protocol are and should remain 
the province of the State’s executive branch.”148 Morales is often cited as one of 
the few successful lethal injection challenges, but in fact, the court went to sig-
nificant lengths to let the state carry out its sentence. It both declined to stay the 
execution and deliberately “fashioned a remedy that was intended to permit 
Defendants to proceed with Plaintiff’s execution as scheduled.”149 
When the issue returned to him, Judge Fogel once again found serious 
problems with California’s procedure.150 But instead of formally finding a viola-
tion and imposing a remedy, he “respectfully suggest[ed] that Defendants  
conduct a thorough review of the lethal-injection protocol.”151 He continued:  
Because California’s next execution is unlikely to occur until the latter 
part of this year, the State presently is in a particularly good position to 
address these issues and put them to rest . . . . [U]nder the doctrines of 
comity and separation of powers, the particulars of California’s lethal-
injection protocol are and should remain the province of the State’s ex-
ecutive branch. A proactive approach by Defendants would go a long 
 
145. Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
146. The anesthesiologists subsequently balked when they realized what was being 
asked of them, and the State was unable to carry out its execution. Morales v. 
Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976-77 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
147. Morales I, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. 
148. Id. at 1046. 
149. Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (discussing Morales I); see also Taylor v. Craw-
ford, No. 05-4173, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Mo. July 25, 2006) (explaining that an in-
junction against the State “was never intended to unreasonably delay Missouri’s 
execution of death row inmates”). 
150. See Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (explaining that the Court was “prepared to 
issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the deficiencies 
in the administration of California’s current lethal-injection protocol that have 
been brought to light in this case” but not doing so yet). 
151. Id. at 975 (quoting Morales I, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1046). 
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way toward maintaining judicial and public confidence in the integrity 
and effectiveness of the protocol.152 
So powerful was the court’s sense of judicial restraint that it allowed the 
state to proceed with executions on its own schedule. Indeed, Judge Fogel as-
sured the state that “despite its critical assessment of Defendants’ performance 
to date, this Court has no intention of interfering with or delaying California’s 
implementation of a constitutional execution protocol. California’s voters and 
legislature repeatedly have expressed their support for capital punishment. This 
case thus presents an important opportunity for executive leadership.”153  
Writing about his ruling later, Judge Fogel reiterated, “[n]owhere in the Memo-
randum did I order, nor have I ever ordered, that the state take any specific  
remedial measure.”154 
At least Judge Fogel’s approach acknowledged the California procedure’s 
flaws.155 By contrast, other courts relying on similar remedial concerns have not 
only failed to find fault with their states’ procedures but also articulated legal 
standards higher than necessary to resolve the given case. In rejecting a  
plaintiff’s lethal injection claim, in Emmett v. Johnson, the Eastern District of  
Virginia, for example, stated that “it is not the office of a federal court to dictate 
to the Commonwealth of Virginia the precise methodology it should employ in 
carrying out a lawful death sentence.”156 Accordingly, it was up to the Virginia 
General Assembly—not a court—to determine “[w]hether or not the procedure 
used should conform to prevailing medical standards of care, or whether there 
is a more humane execution procedure.”157  
One might think that to determine whether a constitutional violation has 
occurred, one should look at the facts and legal standard, while concerns about 
“dictating” a methodology to state government figure more heavily at the re-
medial stage. But the court used this deferential language to reject the plaintiff’s 
claim on the merits, as though merely considering the procedure’s constitution-
ality was just too meddlesome.158 Indeed, the court argued that the plaintiff had 
offered an “expansive interpretation” of the Eighth Amendment by arguing that 
the execution team’s training and qualifications were inadequate.159 The  
 
152. Id. at 975-76 (quoting Morales I, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-47). 
153. Id. at 981-82. 
154. Jeremy Fogel, In the Eye of the Storm: A Judge’s Experience in Lethal-Injection Liti-
gation, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 735, 747 (2008). 
155. Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 978-81. 
156. Emmett v. Johnson, 511 F. Supp. 2d 634, 639 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 532 F.3d 291 
(4th Cir. 2008). 
157. Id. 
158. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (citing comity concerns and declining 
to interfere in state judicial proceedings). 
159. Emmett, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 641. 
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plaintiff, of course, had good reason to link the safety of the procedure to the 
competence of the execution team members, but, from the court’s perspective, 
a ruling for the plaintiff would require the state to hire professionals with medi-
cal training, and this remedy was just too much to ask of Virginia.160  
The outcome in this case may well be correct; the Emmett plaintiffs  
arguably failed to present enough evidence for a court to find a violation.  
Nevertheless, the court’s articulated concerns reflected less about the evidence 
presented and more about its own remedial anxieties. In emphasizing these 
concerns, the court, much like the Supreme Court in Baze, created an onerous 
Eighth Amendment standard that was unnecessary for the resolution of the  
instant case.161 
Remedial concerns have also prompted some courts to backtrack on rulings 
finding serious constitutional problems. In North Carolina, a federal district 
court identified serious problems with the lethal injection procedure and condi-
tioned the next execution on a qualified medical professional’s monitoring of 
anesthetic depth.162 The state responded instead by proposing a revised protocol 
using a bispectral index (BIS) monitor, a machine that some anesthesiologists 
use to help monitor a patient’s anesthetic depth.163 The plaintiff presented  
extensive, virtually unrebutted evidence that, although a BIS monitor may be 
helpful in assessing the effectiveness of anesthesia, it is not suitable as the sole 
indicator of level of consciousness.164 The district court, however, did not stand 
by its initial order. In “clarify[ying]” its ruling, the court did not alter its  
original findings that the state’s procedure was flawed but instead emphasized 
that the inclusion of an anesthesiologist to monitor an aesthetic depth was just 
too burdensome.165 A BIS monitor, the court decided, cured the procedure’s 
flaws. In other words, the court decided that the remedy it had initially imposed 
asked too much of the state, even though it had not analyzed whether procuring 
 
160. See id. (arguing that the Eighth Amendment does not require that the execution 
team consist of medical professionals). 
161. Id. at 642 (explaining that it would be too intrusive to require the States to observe 
“medical norms”). 
162. See Brown v. Beck, No. 06-3018, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006) 
(permitting execution to proceed “on the condition that there are present and ac-
cessible to Plaintiff throughout the execution personnel with sufficient medical 
training to ensure Plaintiff is in all respects unconscious prior to and at the time of 
the administration” of the lethal drugs).  
163. See, e.g., David E. Longnecker et al., Anesthesiology 85 (2007). 
164. Brown v. Beck, 445 F.3d 752, 754-55 (4th Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting) (re-
counting extensive evidence that the use of a BIS monitor in isolation is inappro-
priate and that the State had offered “scant evidence” to rebut plaintiff’s compel-
ling proffer). 
165. See Brown v. Beck, No. 06-3018, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 17, 2006) (accusing 
plaintiff of trying to “force a conflict of medical ethics” and accepting the State’s 
proposed remedy instead of the court’s initial order). 
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the services of an anesthesiologist would, in fact, be difficult. Instead, it  
accepted a manifestly inferior remedy that, on its own, did not correct the dan-
gers the court itself had identified. 
Even though federalism concerns are heightened when federal courts  
review state procedures, such remedial anxieties are not limited to federal 
courts reviewing state execution procedures. Like the North Carolina district 
court in Beck, a Florida state court issued a remedy against the state only to 
change its mind. The lower court initially expressed concern that Florida’s  
revised lethal injection procedure did not “adequately address the events that 
took place during the Diaz execution.”166 The court ordered the state to revise 
its lethal injection procedures in numerous ways, such as improving training, 
including contingency plans, and periodically reviewing DOC procedures.167 
When Florida objected and submitted a protocol with only superficial revisions, 
the court backed down and approved it.168 Indeed, the court backtracked on its 
initial factual assertions and denied that the Diaz execution had been botched, 
notwithstanding its previous ruling that the state had not adequately addressed 
the problems that had arisen during that execution.169 As in Beck, the court did 
not explain why the state’s minor revisions obviated the need for the remedy 
the court had initially ordered. Yet, by accepting the state’s suggested remedy 
and abandoning its own initial order, the court effectively limited the value of 
the Eighth Amendment right. 
In affirming, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized the burden any court 
ordered remedy would impose. Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Florida’s 
training of personnel was inadequate, the court stated that its “role is not to mi-
cromanage the executive branch in fulfilling its own duties relating to execu-
tions.”170 Lest the court be tempted to supplant the political branches’ judgment 
with its own, it adopted a “presumption of deference” that “the methodology 
and the chemicals to be used are matters best left to the Department of Correc-
tions.”171 In other words, remedial concerns were so powerful that the court pre-
sumptively deferred to the DOC without any evidence about the execution  
protocol itself. Such language indicated to future courts that judicial involve-
ment in this area is presumptively illegitimate and that even future claims with 
more compelling evidence of serious risks and viable alternatives should be 
similarly dismissed.  
Federal appellate courts also sometimes focus on remedial issues. After 
holding Missouri’s procedure unconstitutional, the district court in Taylor  
required that the state employ an anesthesiologist to monitor the inmate’s anes-
 
166. See Florida v. Lightbourne, No. 81-170, slip op. at 3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 31, 2007). 
167. Id. at 3-4. 
168. See id. at 5 (denying relief). 
169. Id. at 3. 
170. Lightborne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 351 (Fla. 2007). 
171. Id. at 352 (quoting Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000)). 
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thetic depth.172 The theory was that an anesthesiologist would know if an inmate 
has been sufficiently anesthetized before the administration of the pan-
curonium and potassium, thus protecting him from errors that might occur 
during the procedure.173 In imposing this remedy, the district court was not 
claiming that the Eighth Amendment always required the participation of an 
anesthesiologist. Instead, it reasoned that the state’s haphazard approach to  
lethal injection created a significant risk of excruciating pain and that the inclu-
sion of a trained professional was a reasonable requirement to protect the  
inmate from pain, especially given the misadventures of Dr. Doerhoff and the 
other unqualified, untrained team members. The remedy arose not directly 
from the Eighth Amendment but from the court’s remedial discretion, which 
was triggered by particular facts giving rise to the constitutional violation.  
The Eighth Circuit reversed, emphasizing the state’s “broad discretion” to 
design execution procedures.174 Executions, the Eighth Circuit reminded the 
district court, are not medical procedures, and “no State can carry out an  
execution in the same manner that a hospital monitors an operation.”175 Thus, 
the Eighth Circuit explained, the requirement that Missouri use an anesthesi-
ologist during its executions went far beyond what the Constitution required.176  
In emphasizing that the Constitution did not require the remedy imposed 
by the district court, the Eighth Circuit was stating a correct proposition of con-
stitutional law, but it was also ignoring the applicable standard of review and 
the district court’s reasoning. In the Eighth Circuit and elsewhere, remedies im-
posed by trial courts are reviewed for an abuse of discretion,177 a standard of  
review the court of appeals did not mention once. In opting not to cite or fol-
low the applicable standard of review, the Eighth Circuit not only indicated its 
determination to reverse the district court but also missed the point. Remedies 
imposed to correct constitutional violations are rarely constitutionally required 
in the abstract. To the contrary, trial courts exercise discretion to fashion  
 
172. Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 
2006). 
173. Id. at *7-8. 
174. Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing McKenzie v. 
Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
175. Id. at 1084 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
176. Id.; see also Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 910 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that 
the Constitution does not require the State to hire an anesthesiologist for each 
execution); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1469 (“[W]e are aware of no authority for the 
proposition that the prisoner is entitled, for example, to have a lethal injection 
administered by a physician.”); Hamilton v. Jones, 472 F.3d 814, 816 (10th Cir. 
2007) (same). 
177. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Smith v. Ark. 
Dep’t of Corr. 103 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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remedies based on the nature of the violation.178 In other words, the anesthesi-
ologist requirement might be inappropriate in a different state with different 
facts, but the district court determined that it made sense in Missouri. The 
Eighth Circuit ignored this argument, focusing instead on the correct but legally 
irrelevant proposition that the district court’s chosen remedy was not constitu-
tionally required.  
Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit transitioned from its rejection of the  
remedy to its factual conclusion that “Mr. Taylor has not adduced evidence at 
any stage of this litigation that carries his burden of proving a constitutional 
violation.”179 In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit nowhere explained 
why it found the district court’s factual conclusions unconvincing and again 
evaded the standard of review.180 Indeed, after perfunctorily citing in its intro-
duction the “clear error” standard for a district court’s factual findings after a 
bench trial, the Eighth Circuit did not refer to it again. Instead, it leapt from its 
discussion of the district court’s remedy immediately to its single-paragraph  
announcement that the district court’s factual findings were wrong and that 
there was therefore no Eighth Amendment violation. This cursory discussion, 
however, ignored the district court’s actual findings, particularly its extensive 
analysis of the dangers posed by Dr. Doerhoff and his unqualified execution 
team. The court of appeals, thus, reversed the lower court by glossing over the 
very facts that had given rise to a violation.181 
This is questionable legal analysis, but it is also instructive, because it illus-
trates the extent to which remedial concerns inform courts’ rulings on the con-
stitutional right. In this regard, the Eighth Circuit’s approach is hardly unusual. 
The Eighth Circuit felt that the remedy imposed by the district court was too 
burdensome on the state, and its discussion of the remedy necessarily colored 
its view of the right itself.182 Its leap from remedy to right may have been inart-
 
178. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (emphasizing that the district 
court has “ample authority” to fashion remedies based on the “severity” of estab-
lished violations); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (“Once a right and a violation have been 
shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is 
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”). 
179. Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1085. 
180. See, e.g., Robinson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir. 2006) (ar-
ticulating a clear error standard of review of the trial court’s factual findings). 
181. The court focused instead on the written protocol’s vague assurance of a qualified 
team, even though the State never indicated it was adding qualified personnel to 
the team the lower court had already deemed unqualified. See Taylor, 487 F.3d at 
1082-85 (arguing that the “written protocol” does not present unconstitutional 
risk of pain but ignoring facts about Missouri’s execution team). 
182. Cf. Rutherford v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[F]ederal 
courts considering equitable relief must be ‘sensitive to the State’s strong interest 
in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal 
courts . . . .’” (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006))). 
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ful, but its conflation of the two was nothing extraordinary, sharply limiting the 
value of the Eighth Amendment in practice, without actually claiming to evis-
cerate the right. In short, “the threat of undesirable remedial consequences  
motivate[d] [the] court[] to construct the right in such a way as to avoid those 
consequences.”183  
 
3. Concerns About Delay 
 
Closely related to remedies is the problem of delay. Sometimes § 1983  
actions challenging the method of execution force a stay delaying the date of 
execution while the court hears the case.184 Courts are usually extremely sensi-
tive to this concern. Telling the state to wait to carry out its sentence seems al-
most as invasive as ordering it to reform its institutional practices. Similarly, 
just as a court draws on its equitable powers in crafting a remedy, so too do  
equitable concerns guide its decision of whether or not to issue a stay delaying 
an execution.185 Predictably, then, just as courts are reluctant to exercise their 
equitable powers to impose a remedy telling states what to do, they are also cau-
tious about issuing any order interfering with the expeditious execution of a 
death sentence.186  
Courts, though, are not precise about exactly what—the lawsuit itself, the 
contemplated remedy, or something else—would trigger the delay. Some sug-
gest that merely permitting the litigation to go forward is itself a form of  
relief.187 These courts assume that the litigation’s sole or primary goal is to pro-
long the inmate’s life—particularly when the suit has been filed relatively soon 
before a scheduled execution—and they dismiss the case accordingly.188 This 
 
183. Levinson, supra note 117, at 885. 
184. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, No. 06-1397 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2006) (en banc) (grant-
ing Taylor’s rehearing petition and application for stay); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. 
Supp. 2d 972, 974-78 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (recounting the case’s history including 
execution stay). 
185. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649 (2004) (“A stay is an equitable remedy, 
and ‘[e]quity must take into consideration the State’s strong interest in proceed-
ing with its judgment and . . . attempt[s] at manipulation.’” (quoting Gomez v. 
United States Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992))).  
186. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion) (arguing that 
the finding of a violation would require endless rounds of litigation “touting a 
new and improved methodology”); McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1172 (11th Cir. 
2008) (expressing concern over federal court involvement in state-administered 
executions); Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (states have 
a “significant interest in meting out a sentence of death in a timely fashion” 
(quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004))).  
187. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1506 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Each de-
lay, for its span, is a commutation of a death sentence to one of imprisonment.”). 
188. See, e.g., Berry v. Epps, 506 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Our precedent requires 
the dismissal of ‘eleventh hour’ dilatory claims . . . .”); Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d 
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dismissal can effectively make it impossible for inmates to protect themselves 
against dangerous execution methods. It is true that these suits can cause delay, 
but death row inmates cannot realistically challenge their method of execution 
far in advance. Indeed, when inmates have tried to do so, the state has argued 
persuasively that such early challenges should be dismissed as unripe, because 
the state may change its own protocol before the plaintiff’s execution date.189 
Plaintiffs thus confront a catch-22: early claims can be dismissed as unripe, later 
claims as dilatory.  
Delay does impose costs on states, both financial (resulting primarily from 
renewed litigation) and political (resulting from the inability to execute a law-
fully-imposed sentence). Given these costs, it is understandable that courts 
weigh delay when determining whether to grant relief, especially when inmates 
file claims just weeks or even hours before their scheduled executions. Never-
theless, courts often assume that these claims are disingenuous and treat them 
as though their sole or primary purpose is to delay. While this assumption may 
sometimes be correct, some courts seem to assume this motive before they look 
closely at the evidence. As a result, courts sometimes over-emphasize the  
significance of delay, treating it like a decisive factor rather than one cost to be 
 
1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (“If Grayson truly had intended to challenge Alabama’s 
lethal injection protocol, he would not have deliberately waited to file suit until a 
decision on the merits would be impossible without entry of a stay or an expe-
dited litigation schedule.”); Harris v. Johnson, 376 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“By waiting as long as he did, Harris leaves little doubt that the real purpose be-
hind his claim is to seek a delay of his execution . . . .”). 
  There is some truth to the view that such litigation is sometimes a delaying 
tactic, but many lethal injection claims are brought by lawyers who are genuinely 
concerned about the protocols and appalled that the States have taken so few 
measures to understand or improve their methods. Indeed, the fact that several 
law firms have chosen to enter these cases in recent years lends credence to this 
position; law firms have little interest in expending valuable pro bono resources 
by pursuing delay for the sake of delay. 
189. See Alley v. Little, 452 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“Had 
[plaintiff] attempted to challenge his method of execution before the method had 
been chosen, or before he had even been presented with the choice under the 
State’s procedure, his challenge would clearly have faced issues of ripeness.”); 
Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 583 n.3 (Mo. 2005) (finding that, because “it 
is unknown what method, if any, of lethal injection may be utilized by the 
State . . . [when] execution date and method are set, it is premature for this Court 
to consider whether a particular method of lethal injection violates the Eighth 
Amendment”); Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (hold-
ing that a lethal-injection challenge was not “ripe,” because there was no execu-
tion date and the “method in which lethal injection is currently administered is 
not determinative of the way it will be administered at the moment of appellant’s 
execution”); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring that factual contentions have 
likely evidentiary support); Defs’ 11/8/2006 Motion To Strike, United States v. 
Higgs (D. Md. 2006) (No. 98-0520) (U.S. government arguing that plaintiff’s 
method-of-execution challenge was unripe because execution was not imminent). 
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weighed equitably.190 To the extent that delay sometimes obstructs a court from 
ever considering the merits of a constitutional claim, this outcome is troubling: 
it is odd to think that such equitable concerns should necessarily trump consti-
tutional ones. However, when courts dismiss lethal injection claims because of 
the delay they create without examining the extent of or reason for the delay or 
the potential merits of the action, they subordinate the Eighth Amendment 
right to non-constitutional equities. In so doing, courts dismiss potentially 
meritorious claims with barely a glance at the relevant facts and law.191  
Similarly, courts’ instinct to blame the plaintiff for any delay ignores the ex-
tent to which fault often lies with the state.192 As Justice Stevens pointed out, 
“[s]tates wishing to decrease the risk that future litigation will delay execu-
tions . . . would do well to reconsider their continued use of pancuronium bro-
mide.”193 Stevens’s advice stems from the fact that, without the paralytic, it 
would be much easier to determine during an execution whether inmates were 
suffering pain. Pancuronium makes it probable that problems during an execu-
tion will go undetected. Without it, states could win these cases much more 
quickly by pointing to apparently peaceful executions as indication of unprob-
lematic procedures.  
Indeed, as Judge Fogel summarized, were states’ main objective to resume 
executions, “their unwillingness to see the situation for what it is and to be pro-
active is self-defeating.”194 Basic protocol changes would have avoided much 
litigation. The one-drug protocol, for example, is painless and therefore com-
paratively immune from a colorable Eighth Amendment challenge and its ac-
 
190. See, e.g., Berry, 506 F.3d at 404 (requiring dismissal for “eleventh hour” claim re-
gardless of the merits or reasons for delay). 
191. It is true that equitable concerns frequently guide courts’ approaches to cases 
(constitutional or otherwise), so it is understandable and appropriate that con-
cerns about delay would be part of courts’ calculus and would even be decisive in 
the case of some last-minute actions. It is harder to understand, though, why an 
equitable factor like delay should receive so much weight that constitutional 
claims are treated sometimes as presumptively bogus, even in cases where the suit 
was not filed at the last minute or could not have been filed earlier, such as when 
an inmate challenges a recently adopted or revised execution procedure. See 
Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 328 n.2, 352 (Fla. 2007) (adopting the 
presumption that lethal injection claims are invalid in a case with no outstanding 
death warrant challenging Florida’s procedure after the State implemented 
changes to its execution protocol following the botched Diaz execution). 
192. See, e.g., Cooey v. Taft, No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2007 WL 2607583, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 
5, 2007) (“Any argument that the granting of an injunction would harm the 
State’s interest in fulfilling the judgment . . . in a timely manner is somewhat dis-
ingenuous, considering that but for the State’s interlocutory appeal, many if not 
all of the underlying issues would in all likelihood have been resolved by now.”). 
193. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1546 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
194. See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 982 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
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companying delays.195 Death row inmates could, of course, challenge even this 
procedure, but such suits would probably be dismissed quickly. A bogus chal-
lenge to a painless procedure would take much less time than a serious chal-
lenge to the far more complicated and dangerous three-drug procedure.196 
Many courts, however, seem to fear that, were they to intervene, they would be 
blamed for stopping executions.197 They therefore treat any delay as an unac-
ceptable interference in state affairs, akin to constitutional remedies stipulating 
the specific allocation of state resources. In so doing, they implicitly limit the 
practical value of the underlying constitutional right.  
 
B. The Structural Injunction’s Shadow over Lethal Injection 
 
To make sense of why remedial concerns have so influenced courts in these 
cases, it is helpful to situate them in the broader context of public law litigation. 
Many judges today are acutely sensitive to accusations that courts tread too 
heavily on the democratic branches. This sensitivity is, in part, a result of a 
backlash against what has been seen as excessive judicial intervention in struc-
tural reform litigation and also a reflection of more restrained judicial values 
generally.  
The structural reform suit is “one in which a judge, confronting a state  
bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure 
the organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present insti-
tutional arrangements.”198 Structural reform litigation, then, often seeks to  
revamp the practices of large state bureaucracies. School desegregation and 
prison conditions actions are archetypal structural reform cases.199  
Lethal injection cases are not structural reform suits, and most courts do 
not say that they are. (Most courts do not reach the remedial stage of lethal  
injection litigation, so they are also not terribly precise about exactly how  
remedial concerns affect their decision-making.) There are, nevertheless, fea-
tures of lethal injection actions that bring to mind courts’ concerns in more 
 
195. Even skeptics of the one-drug protocol do not allege that it causes pain. See, e.g., 
Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring) (raising concerns about the one-drug 
protocol, but not that it causes pain); infra notes 313-314 and accompanying text. 
196. See infra Subsection IV.A.1 (discussing the one-drug alternative). 
197. See McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1172 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly admonished courts regarding their obligation to guard against litiga-
tion brought solely for the purpose of delay.”); Emmett v. Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 
2d 543, 551-52 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“To unsettle these expectations [in timely disposi-
tion of sentences] is to inflict a profound injury to the powerful and legitimate in-
terest in punishing the guilty . . . .” (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 
556 (1998)) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
198. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1979). 
199. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. et al., Civil Rights Actions: Enforcing the Con-
stitution 849-51 (2d ed. 2007). 
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sweeping structural reform actions. For example, executions take place in pris-
ons, a context in which courts usually are especially deferential because institu-
tional security should be left to prison officials, not unknowledgeable judges.200 
Additionally, the scientific and medical angle of lethal injection is far outside 
judges’ expertise.201 Although structural reform cases do not necessarily impli-
cate scientific issues, they frequently do involve complicated policy determina-
tions that, like scientific inquiries, are deemed beyond judicial expertise.202 
There is also the aforementioned concern that the litigation will delay execu-
tions, thus interfering with the state’s substantive and democratic decision to 
have the death penalty. Furthermore, like much structural reform litigation, 
many lethal injection actions have multiple plaintiffs since all death row in-
mates in a state are affected by the litigation.203 Some inmates have sought to 
intervene in ongoing lethal injection cases,204 while others have even banded to-
gether to file a class action.205  
 
200. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 (1981) (“[C]ourts have been espe-
cially deferential to prison authorities in the adoption and execution of policies 
and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and dis-
cipline and to maintain institutional security.”) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (same); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (“[F]ederal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude 
towards problems of prison administration . . . . [T]he problems of prisons in 
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily 
susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive plan-
ning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the 
province of the legislative and executive branches of government.”). 
201. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion) (dismissing a judi-
cial approach that would “embroil the courts in ongoing scientific controversies 
beyond their expertise”); cf. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (explaining that in examining an agency determina-
tion “at the frontiers of science . . . a reviewing court must generally be at its most 
deferential”). 
202. See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and 
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635, 641 (1982). 
203. See, e.g., Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1520; Walker v. Epps, No. 07-176, 2008 WL 2095704 
(N.D. Miss. May 16, 2008); Cooey v. Strickland, No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 471536 
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2008); Bowling v. Haas, No. 07-cv-07, 2007 WL 403875 (E.D. 
Ky. Jan. 31, 2007); Anderson v. Evans, No. 05-0825, 2006 WL 83093 (W.D. Okla. 
Jan. 11, 2006); Complaint, Roane v. Gonzales, No. 05-2337 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2005). 
204. See, e.g., Clemons v. Crawford, No. 07-4129, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 4, 2007) 
(granting motion to intervene). 
205. See Jackson v. Danberg, 240 F.R.D. 145, 147-49 (D. Del. 2007) (granting plaintiffs’ 
motion to be certified as a class action for their lethal injection suit); see also 2 
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution 350 (2d 
ed. 1993) (describing structural reform cases as tending to involve more parties). 
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Finally, and most importantly, lethal injection litigation, like structural in-
junction suits, seeks to reform the way a state carries out its duties and thus in-
trudes on the state’s policy-making prerogative.206 These cases implicate per-
sonnel, training, drugs, architecture, drug administration apparatuses, 
monitoring, recordkeeping, and contingency plans. Given lethal injection’s 
complicated design, some courts finding problems have retained jurisdiction to 
ensure compliance, a tactic commonly employed by courts in structural reform 
actions.207 To this extent, lethal injection suits implicate structural concerns, 
seeking to revise the very structures and processes by which the state carries out 
the death penalty. Thus, even though courts rarely suggest that lethal injection 
actions are a form of structural reform litigation, the judiciary’s general reluc-
tance to impose structural injunctions in recent decades likely plays into its 
similar remedial anxieties in lethal injection cases. Indeed, as concerns about 
judicial involvement in public affairs have increased, there has been an in-
creased tendency to regard with suspicion any constitutional remedy against the 
state.208  
This increased suspicion grows out of the large scope of many structural re-
form cases. The typical structural injunction case seeks to remedy alleged con-
stitutional violations by reforming the everyday workings of large public insti-
tutions such as schools, prisons, or mental health hospitals.209 As then-Professor 
Fletcher explains, this litigation tends to be sprawling with many parties, and 
the finding of a constitutional violation is usually only a prelude to a prolonged, 
complicated process of devising an order directing the state to reform its insti-
tutions.210 Sometimes these remedial decrees are extremely detailed and stipu-
late, for example, the precise staffing ratios or types and quantities of food to be 
served in a prison.211 It is then easy to see why judicial involvement would at-
 
206. See 2 Dobbs, supra note 205, at 349 (describing structural injunction cases as civil 
rights cases in which the plaintiffs attempt to halt wrongful practices by reforming 
social institutions). 
207. See Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *9 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 
2006) (“The Court will retain jurisdiction over the State’s implementation of the 
lethal injection protocol for the next six executions or until the Court is satisfied 
that the protocol is being administered in a consistent fashion.”); Morales v. 
Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (ordering California to advise 
the court within thirty days how long it will take to review and revise execution 
protocol); see also 2 Dobbs, supra note 205, at 350 (noting that structural injunc-
tions often involve ongoing judicial administration). 
208. See Poser, supra note 109, at 298 (“[T]hose who contend that courts should not be 
involved in institutional reform litigation, whether for capacity or legitimacy rea-
sons, focus on the remedial phase of the litigation, as this is where judicial in-
volvement strays from its traditional role.”). 
209. Fletcher, supra note 202, at 636. 
210. Id. at 638. 
211. Id. at 639. 
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tract criticism; such decrees intrude greatly into the daily operations of a public 
institution and judges have little to guide them beyond their own intuition with 
respect to such operations. This role moves the judge “far beyond the normal 
competence and authority of a judicial officer, into an arena where legal aspira-
tions, bureaucratic possibilities, and political constraints converge, and where 
ordinary legal rules frequently are inapplicable.”212 
Unsurprisingly, then, by the late 1970s, many scholars, politicians, and 
judges began openly questioning whether decrees of this nature were within the 
scope of legitimate judicial power.213 Considered especially problematic was ju-
dicial intervention in “polycentric” problems, which are “complex problem[s] 
with a number of subsidiary problem centers, each of which is related to the 
others, such that the solution to each depends on the solution to all the oth-
ers.”214 Polycentric problems often involve non-legal elements with conse-
quences that extend far beyond the litigation and reach thousands of people. 
For example, litigation challenging the constitutionality of state prison condi-
tions presumably seeks a judicial order requiring improvements to the prison 
system. But improvements cost money, and additional money spent on prisons 
necessarily siphons off money that might otherwise be spent elsewhere.215 Such 
judicial involvement is problematic in part because judges’ remedial decrees 
usually are guided by their sense of how to remedy the constitutional wrong, 
not by other non-legal problems that might arise from the imposition of a par-
ticular remedy.216 Even if sensitive to these concerns, a judge is unlikely to ac-
count for all of the different interests and expenses. That task is better left to the 
political branches, which, after all, manage the budget not just for prisons but 
for all social institutions.  
There are, thus, good reasons for courts to exercise restraint issuing institu-
tional decrees, and judges have become increasingly skeptical about the merits 
of structural reform litigation.217 In practice, this awareness has meant not only 
an increased reluctance to impose structural reform injunctions but also often a 
limitation of the right itself. If a court focuses on the plaintiffs’ rights, the reme-
dial question becomes whether the defendant has taken the necessary steps to 
cure the constitutional violation. But “if the court focuses more on the remedial 
 
212. Id. at 640-41. 
213. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 949, 973 (1978) (calling for “heightened judicial sensitivity” to the implica-
tions of the “proliferation and regularization of broad institutional relief” issued 
by courts). 
214. Fletcher, supra note 202, at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
215. Id. at 646; see also Mishkin, supra note 213, at 965 (“An institutional remedy inevi-
tably involves allocation of state resources, at times in major amounts.”). 
216. Fletcher, supra note 202, at 647. 
217. John C. Jeffries Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1387, 1410 (2007). 
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issue, it will conceive of a remedy in terms of the duty and then consider it im-
plemented when the defendants can demonstrate implementation, or at least a 
good faith effort to implement it as far as possible.”218 The remedy, then, has be-
come “part of the definition of the right.”219 Indeed, the more courts focus on 
remedial difficulties, the more likely it is that the underlying right will be con-
strained so that a finding of a violation will become less likely. 
Of course, remedy can constrain right in numerous ways, and, in structural 
reform litigation, there was often an iterative process in which a series of judi-
cial decisions fleshed out what a constitutional principle required of state ac-
tors.220 As we have seen, lethal injection cases have usually proceeded along a 
different track: remedial concerns limit the scope of the right in the first in-
stance so that judges never find violations. This limitation is significant because 
when courts refer generally to remedial concerns in declining to find a constitu-
tional violation, they are not being precise about exactly why there is no viola-
tion. Remedy, then, constrains the right by muddying courts’ analyses, inviting 
judges to point vaguely to remedial obstacles rather than to particular facts that 
might or might not create a significant risk of pain.221 
One should not overstate the importance of structural reform litigation’s 
history on lethal injection suits. Although some commentators conclude that 
structural reform litigation is “something that is over and done with,”222 the 
more accepted view is that structural reform injunction these days is not so 
much dead as different—narrower and less intrusive.223 To be sure, some courts 
have noted the similarities between lethal injection suits and structural reform 
suits,224 but for most courts, the backlash against structural reform injunctions 
provides not a direct analogy but a culture in which they approach public law 
litigation. Courts these days are hesitant to reach remedial questions, particu-
 
218. Poser, supra note 109, at 323-24. 
219. Levinson, supra note 117, at 881. 
220. See id. at 874-84 (discussing school desegregation, prison conditions, and appor-
tionment cases). 
221. See supra Section II.A. 
222. Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree 10 (2003) (citing 
scholars holding this view). 
223. See Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s 
Still Moving!, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 143 (2003) (arguing that despite the decline of 
structural reform litigation, lawsuits seeking judicial decrees governing the admis-
sions criteria of state-run educational institutions resemble such litigation); 
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and 
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 550, 602-04 (2006) (arguing that reports of 
the death of the structural reform injunction are greatly exaggerated). 
224. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531-32 (2008) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 562 (1979)); supra Section II.A (discussing court decisions expressing reluc-
tance to interfere with State execution procedures). 
Article - Eric Berger - 28 - Production - 2009.05.15.doc 5/15/2009 1:00 PM 
LETHAL INJECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES  
 301 
larly in politically charged cases, such as those involving the death penalty.225 As 
we shall see, however, to the extent these factors have dissuaded judicial in-
volvement, courts have misunderstood these cases and the remedial issues they 
present.  
 
III. Political Process Failures and the Need for Judicial Intervention 
 
If states took more care in designing their lethal injection procedures, 
courts’ inclination to defer to the political branches would have a great deal 
more merit. But many states have given little to no consideration to the method 
by which they carry out their most solemn duty.226 To the contrary, many states 
have haphazardly slapped together a procedure, blindly following other states, 
who themselves failed to give real thought to it in the first place. While these 
and related shortcomings do not themselves amount to an Eighth Amendment 
violation, they collectively result in a political process failure undeserving of ju-
dicial deference.227  
 
225. To some extent, this reluctance may be because some courts have not internalized 
the extent to which structural reform injunctions today can be “less intrusive . . . . 
[t]ypically avoid[ing] the ‘kitchen sink’ approach to institutional reform in favor 
of orders that identify goals the defendants are expected to achieve . . . .” Jeffries & 
Rutherglen, supra note 217, at 1411-12; see also Charles F. Sabel & William H. 
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1016, 1019 (2004) (arguing that a new experimental injunction “combines 
more flexible and provisional norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder 
participation and measured accountability”). 
226. The following discussion summarizes common ways in which State governments 
have enacted lethal injection procedures; it does not argue that each State’s behav-
ior conforms exactly to the general approaches summarized here. 
227. By “political process failure,” I refer collectively to a series of legislative, executive, 
and administrative failings, including democratically elected legislative and execu-
tive officials’ failure to participate in the design of the procedure; delegation by 
those elected officials to unelected DOC officials; further delegation by unelected 
DOC officials to unelected, unqualified, and untrained execution team members; 
a failure by both elected and unelected officials to consult experts; a lack of over-
sight by both elected and unelected officials; a lack of transparency, including a 
refusal to share the details of the procedure with either litigants or the general 
public; harm to a “discrete and insular” minority group lacking political power; 
and a refusal to reconsider the protocol and subject it to normal administrative 
procedures, even as serious problems have come to light. I am, in other words, us-
ing the term “political process failure” in a broader way than it is used when refer-
ring to voting rights and other election-related issues. 
  It is also worth noting that while my discussion of “political process failures” 
exceeds the precise terms of footnote four of Carolene Products, see United States 
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), some lethal injection proce-
dures arguably would receive heightened scrutiny under any of footnote four’s 
theories. First, the procedures trigger a specific provision of the Bill of Rights (the 
Eighth Amendment). Second, while some of the legislative and administrative 
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The basic narrative of the development of lethal injection in the United 
States is now well known. In 1977 Oklahoma became the first state to adopt le-
thal injection. State legislators consulted with Jay Chapman, the chief medical 
examiner for Oklahoma. Even though Chapman’s “first response was that [he] 
was an expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them that way,” he 
quickly changed course and declared, “[t]o hell with them: let’s do this 
thing.”228 Chapman and two legislators then quickly drafted the statute, which 
focused on the types of drugs to use, not the details of administration. The re-
sulting protocol did not require execution teams to include trained personnel. 
Nor was it ever scientifically studied.229 Chapman today expresses shock that le-
thal injection is not performed by doctors but by individuals with little under-
standing of the dangers posed by the drugs.230 As he now puts it, “it never oc-
curred to me when we set this up that we’d have complete idiots administering 
the drugs.”231  
The Oklahoma legislature passed the bill, and it was then copied—first by 
Texas and then by other states.232 From 1977 to 2002, thirty-seven state legisla-
tures adopted Oklahoma’s brand of lethal injection, but they did so without 
conducting their own evaluation of the procedure’s risks. Instead, they dele-
gated the procedure to unelected officials who mimicked Oklahoma’s choices 
without actually examining the advantages and disadvantages of the proce-
dure.233 As Dr. Zimmers and Dr. Koniaris argue, “no research whatsoever—
clinical, veterinary, medical literature search, or other—was ever performed” at 
 
failings I discuss are likely not fully encompassed by the footnote’s concern with 
legislation restricting political processes, the States’ deliberate lack of transparency 
does render it unlikely that usual political processes could be expected to identify, 
much less fix, the problems. Third, the procedures uniquely burden a “discrete 
and insular” minority (death row inmates) that would be unlikely to protect itself 
through normal political processes. See id. 
228. Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 66 (quoting E-mail from A. Jay Chapman, 
Forensic Pathologist, Santa Rosa, Cal., to Deborah W. Denno, Professor of Law, 
Fordham Law Sch. (Jan. 18, 2006)); William J. Wiseman, Jr., Confessions of a For-
mer Legislator, Christian Century, June 20-27, 2001, at 7. 
229. Denno, Paradox, supra note 28, at 90-120; Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 70. 
Of course, the protocol could not be tested on humans, but States could have 
studied the dangers associated with each of the drugs. 
230. See Human Rights Watch, So Long as They Die: Lethal Injections in the 
United States 33 (2006). 
231. Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (quoting E-mail 
from A. Jay Chapman, Forensic Pathologist, Santa Rosa, Cal. to Deborah W. 
Denno, Professor of Law, Fordham Law Sch. (Jan. 18, 2006)). 
232. Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 78. 
233. Id. at 79. 
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any level of government when states adopted lethal injection.234 As one trial 
court summarized, “there is scant evidence that ensuing States’ adoption of le-
thal injection was supported by any additional medical or scientific studies . . . . 
Rather . . . the various States simply fell in line relying solely on Oklahoma’s 
protocol . . . .”235  
Some states’ statutes reflect this haphazard adoption, failing even to state 
accurately the actual drugs used. Several state statutes, for instance, refer only to 
a barbiturate and paralytic, leaving out reference to potassium chloride, even 
though the protocol in practice does include potassium.236 Other state statutes 
vaguely authorize the use of lethal drugs without specifying which ones.237 
South Dakota recently rewrote its statute along these lines to make it vaguer so 
as to give its corrections department more flexibility.238 When the legislature de-
liberately makes a statute vaguer in order to punt authority entirely to unelected 
prison officials, who themselves are unqualified and not inclined to seek expert 
advice,239 courts should not defer to that same legislature merely because it has 
been democratically elected. In such instances, Baze’s warning that a judicially 
imposed remedy “would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in 
implementing their execution procedures”240 rings hollow.  
 
234. Teresa A. Zimmers & Leonidas G. Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying 
Problems in the Design and Implementation of Lethal Injection for Execution, 35 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 919, 921 (2008). 
235. Baze v. Rees, No. 04-CI-01094, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Cir. Ct. July 8, 2005), aff’d, 217 
S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008); see also Denno, Quandary, su-
pra note 28, at 78-79 (providing a history of the development and spread of lethal 
injection in the United States). 
236. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-617(a)(1) (2006) (“The punishment of death is to 
be administered by a continuous intravenous injection of a lethal quantity of an 
ultra-short-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent un-
til the defendant’s death is pronounced.”); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2716 (2008) 
(same); Md. Code Ann., [Corr. Servs.] § 3-905 (West 2008) (same); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 99-19-51 (2007) (same); Mont. Code. Ann. § 46-19-103 (2007) (same); 
N.M. Stat. § 31-14-11 (2008) (same); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-187 (2007) (same); 
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1014(A) (2003) (same); Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 
94 & n.306. 
237. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-704 (2009) (“The penalty of death shall be 
inflicted by an intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quan-
tity sufficient to cause death, under the supervision of the state department of cor-
rections.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (2008) (proscribing similar guide-
lines); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-38 (2008) (proscribing similar guidelines); Tex. 
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.14 (Vernon 2009) (proscribing similar guidelines). 
238. See S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-32 (2006) (amended 2007); Denno, Quan-
dary, supra note 28, at 94 & nn.304 & 307 (discussing South Dakota’s revised stat-
ute). 
239. See infra notes 270-272 and accompanying text. 
240. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
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Many states’ refusal to disclose the details of their own procedures com-
pounds the problem. As recently as October 2007, only six lethal injection states 
provided what Professor Denno termed “complete” public protocols,241 and 
even those protocols did not give details about important information such as 
the qualifications and training of the execution team members. This lack of 
transparency makes it nearly impossible for the public to understand a lethal 
injection procedure’s risks, thereby insulating it from democratic revision.242  
Relatedly, states also routinely resist discovery in an effort to divulge as little 
information about the method by which they plan to execute the plaintiff.243 
Courts are often complicit, reluctant to impose discovery burdens on states and 
sensitive to concerns about the executioners’ anonymity.244 While executioner 
anonymity is certainly a legitimate state interest, it is not a sound reason for de-
nying plaintiffs’ discovery requests, since sensitive material can be redacted and 
subject to protective orders forbidding the public disclosure of information that 
might reveal an executioner’s identity.245  
When details do come to light, the record often highlights the failed proc-
esses and delegations by which the protocol was adopted and retained. In some 
states, neither elected politicians nor DOC officials played a role in designing 
 
241. Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 95. The States Denno cites are Colorado, 
Connecticut, Georgia, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington. Id. 
242. Id. at 96; see also Adam Liptak, After Flawed Executions, States Resort to Secrecy, 
N.Y. Times, July 30, 2007, at A9 (“In the wake of several botched executions 
around the nation, often performed by poorly trained workers, you might think 
that we would want to know more, not less, about the government employees 
charged with delivering death on behalf of the state.”). 
243. See supra notes 79-80, 91 and accompanying text. 
244. See, e.g., Moeller v. Weber, No. 04-4200, 2008 WL 1957842 (D.S.D. May 2, 2008) 
(denying in part plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery); Timberlake v. Donahue, 
No. 06-1859, 2007 WL 141950, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2007) (ordering that execu-
tion team members testify in a manner to preserve anonymity, and that “plaintiff 
will endeavor to eliminate or reduce the desired need for any such testimony”); 
Moore v. Rees, No. 06-22, 2007 WL 1035013, at *10 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007) 
(granting plaintiff’s motion to depose the execution team, but noting defendant’s 
“strong interest in preserving the safety, and hence anonymity” of the team mem-
bers); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1236660, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 
2006) (denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider denial of discovery request for 
depositions and limit access to only six of sixty-six past execution records); Hill v. 
McDonough, No. 06-032, 2006 WL 2556938, at *2 n.5 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2006) 
(suggesting that because Florida State Court had already ruled on a lethal injec-
tion challenge in 2000, plaintiff was not entitled to discovery about the procedure 
as it existed in 2006). 
245. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (stating that court may issue protective orders); see also 
Moeller, 2008 WL 1957842, at *4 (allowing State to submit sensitive materials for in 
camera review); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 31, 2005) (grant-
ing protective order). 
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the procedure, and yet often those same officials fought vigorously to retain the 
status quo. In Missouri, for example, Dr. Doerhoff boasted that he was respon-
sible for the entire procedure because the DOC director “has no background” 
in either medicine or corrections and was therefore “totally dependent on me 
advising him what could and should and will be done.”246 Furthermore, because 
Missouri had no written protocol, there were “no checks and balances or over-
sight” on Doerhoff’s capricious judgment.247 Doerhoff, an independent contrac-
tor, thus had complete discretion to change the procedure “at a moment’s no-
tice.”248 This discretion included the authority to lower the thiopental doses, 
even though his dyslexia rendered him unable to calculate dosages accurately.249 
The Missouri legislature then delegated the matter to the DOC director, who in 
turn delegated it to Dr. Doerhoff. At no step along the way did Missouri inquire 
whether it was delegating the issue to someone with the requisite expertise. 
Despite these serious problems and the accompanying lack of accountabil-
ity, Missouri fought vigorously to retain its existing lethal injection procedure 
and never took the initiative to improve it. Even after Judge Gaitan required 
Missouri to submit a revised protocol, the new protocol was conceived not by 
DOC officials, execution team members, or medical experts, but by legal coun-
sel.250 This approach reflects Missouri’s concern with secrecy over safety. By 
turning over the new protocol to lawyers, Missouri did not consult experts in a 
meaningful way, but it could claim that the details regarding the new proce-
dure’s adoption were subject to attorney-client privilege.251  
Predictably, although the new product did include some improvements (at 
least it was in writing), it did not remove the fundamental flaws that had 
prompted the court to find a violation in the first place.252 Most bafflingly, Mis-
souri refused to cut ties with Doerhoff, despite his admitted dyslexia, his un-
apologetic sua sponte changes to the procedure, and a public reprimand for fail-
ing to disclose more than twenty malpractice suits against him.253 Instead, the 
state actually argued that it should be permitted to keep Doerhoff, reiterating its 
 
246. Doe Deposition, supra note 39, at 63-64. DOC officials confirmed that they “de-
pended on [Doerhoff] heavily.” Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, 367-68. 
247. Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *4, *7. 
248. Id. at *7. 
249. See id. at *5 (citing Doe Deposition, supra note 39); supra Section I.A. 
250. Defendants’ 9/11/2007 Responses to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories, Clemons v. Craw-
ford, No. 07-4129 (W.D. Mo. May 1, 2008). 
251. Id. 
252. See Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2006) (not-
ing that Eighth Amendment standards can be met in various ways but that State’s 
revised protocols “fall short of those standards”). 
253. See Missouri Proposed Execution Protocol 1 (July 14, 2006) (discussing execution 
team members and not renouncing Doerhoff); Kohler, supra note 42. 
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full “confidence” in his “capabilities.”254 When the DOC finally relented months 
later and announced that it would comply with the court’s ruling barring Doer-
hoff’s participation, it made no effort to find qualified people to take his place, 
even though the record made clear that nobody else on the Missouri execution 
team knew “anything about” the procedure.255 It would be a perverse theory of 
democracy that would afford the state deference under these circumstances.  
California has a similar record, only ostensibly addressing problems that 
have come to light.256 After the state failed to set an intravenous line properly 
during one execution, it assured the district court that it had learned its “lesson” 
and that that error “will never occur again.”257 As the court later pointed out, 
though, California “did not take steps sufficient to ensure that a similar or 
worse problem would not occur,” choosing instead to “tweak” its procedure 
rather than engage in substantive revisions.258 The result was that “the questions 
[about the procedure’s safety] have become even more substantial.”259 The Cali-
fornia execution team’s obdurate attitudes are perhaps best summed up by one 
team member’s reaction after an apparently botched execution: “shit does hap-
pen, so.”260 And yet its “tweaks” provided the illusion of real revision, thereby 
helping to protect the procedure from democratic review. 
Indeed, even legitimate efforts to improve the procedure were made in se-
crecy without democratic deliberation. Following the court’s rulings, the Cali-
fornia DOC began erecting a new execution chamber to correct some of its pro-
cedure’s problems. (California uses its old lethal gas chamber for lethal 
injection, creating unique architectural difficulties, such as IV bags placed too 
 
254. See Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 25, at 353, 356, 360, 387-89 (testimony of 
DOC officials); Brief of Petioner-Appellant at 45, Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 
1072 (8th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1397). 
255. See Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2006) (bar-
ring Doerhoff); Letter from G. Anders to M. Gans, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (April 24, 2008) (discussing the State’s removal of 
Doerhoff without finding new personnel with medical qualifications); Doe Depo-
sition, supra note 39, at 22. 
        Despite Judge Gaitan’s ruling barring Dr. Doerhoff from participation in Mis-
souri executions, Doerhoff has continued to participate in federal and Arizona 
executions. See Michael Kiefer, Doctor Banned from Executions in Mo. Now in Az.,  
Ariz. Republic, July 24, 2008, available at http://www.azcentral.com/ 
arizonarepublic/news/articles/2008/07/24/20080724deathpenaltydoc0724.html; 
Henry Weinstein, Doctor Barred by State Helps in U.S. Executions, L.A. Times, 
Nov. 16, 2007, at A17 [hereinafter Weinstein, Doctor Barred]. 
256. See supra Section I.A. 
257. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (2006). 
258. Id. at 977-79. 
259. Id. at 980. 
260. Id. at 979 n.8. 
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high on walls for the execution team to verify whether the equipment is prop-
erly working.261) But the DOC never informed the state legislature of these plans 
and expenses. When the legislature found out, it complained that it had not 
been informed, halting work on the new facility.262 Even if the DOC deserves 
some commendation for seeking to build an improved facility, its decision to 
keep secret its plans and bypass the California legislature further demonstrates 
that these procedures escape the usual democratic processes. In fact, it was not 
even clear that the newly designed facility would cure the problems identified by 
the district court.263 Judge Fogel, for his part, sought to address the transparency 
problem by placing responsibility with Governor Schwarzenegger, who 
promptly insisted on reviewing the protocol in secrecy.264  
Even when states agree to review their entire approach to executions, those 
efforts have often been cynical. In Tennessee, for instance, Governor Bredesen 
revoked apparently-problematic lethal injection protocols so that the Commis-
sioner of Corrections could examine Tennessee’s three-drug procedure. Com-
missioner Little appointed a Protocol Committee, which consulted with two 
anesthesiologists, including Dr. Mark Dershwitz, a lethal injection expert who 
has testified as the states’ expert in several cases around the country.265 The Pro-
tocol Committee later presented a report summarizing the relative merits of dif-
ferent approaches and stressing the one-drug protocol’s simplicity and reduced 
chance of error.266 Emphasizing physician unanimity on the one-drug proto-
col’s appropriateness and the three-drug protocol’s dangers, the committee rec-
ommended that Tennessee switch to the one-chemical protocol.267  
Commissioner Little rejected this proposal “within a day or two,” conclud-
ing that he did not want “Tennessee to be at the forefront of making the change 
 
261. Id. at 980. 
262. See Henry Weinstein, New Execution Protocol Proposed, L.A. Times, May 16, 2007, 
at B1. 
263. See, e.g., Testimony Before the California State Senate Public Safety Committee 5 
(statement of Professor Ty Alper) (May 8, 2007) (“Despite the fact that a great 
deal of money has already been spent on the new construction, it is also not at all 
clear whether the new execution chamber even satisfies Judge Fogel’s concerns 
about the execution facilities, because the design plans for the partially-
constructed chamber have not been made public.”). 
264. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 122. Judge Fogel denied the Governor’s 
efforts to keep deliberations about the protocol secret. Id. 
265. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (recounting the 
creation of the committee). 
266. Id. at 876 (citing the Protocol Committee’s report). 
267. Id. at 876-78. 
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from the three-drug protocol to the one drug protocol.”268 If Tennessee’s three-
drug protocol were declared unconstitutional, it could then consider making 
the change. Commissioner Little, an unelected state official, thus rejected the 
proposal of a committee that had closely studied the relative merits of the dif-
ferent options. In so doing, he even chose not to add a step that would monitor 
the inmate’s consciousness, even though the committee had stressed that the 
three-drug protocol would likely require such a measure.269  
The Tennessee story is a perfect example of why courts should intervene. 
An unelected state official summarily vetoed the recommendations of a com-
mittee that had consulted experts and given careful thought to the matter. 
Moreover, he did so without consulting his own experts or offering any alterna-
tive theory of the evidence. Under such circumstances, none of the usual rea-
sons for deferring to the political branches apply.270 Delegation to unelected of-
ficials is not necessarily inappropriate—legislatures delegate authority to 
administrative agencies all the time—but typically delegation promises some 
degree of agency expertise.271 Where unelected officials lack such expertise and 
fail to consult experts themselves, the delegation itself becomes problematic.272  
 
268. Id. at 879-80 (quoting Commissioner Little). Little initially denied that the Proto-
col Committee had recommended a one-drug protocol, but he ultimately admit-
ted that it had. Id. 
269. Id. at 877, 886. 
270. Even given the deference afforded to the policy determinations of administrative 
agencies, courts will engage in a “hard look” to ensure that such decisions were 
based on proper considerations. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbi-
trary and capricious if the agency . . . failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem . . . .”); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
416 (1971) (holding that court must make a “searching and careful” inquiry to en-
sure that an agency “decision was based on a consideration of the relevant fac-
tors”). 
271. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115 (1976) (stating that an ad-
ministrative agency “has an obligation to perform its responsibilities with some 
degree of expertise”); Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: To-
ward Effective Risk Regulation 61 (1993) (explaining that expertise is a virtue 
of bureaucracy and that agencies therefore typically should “understand th[e] 
subject matter at least well enough to communicate with substantive experts, to 
identify the better experts, and to determine which insights of the underlying dis-
cipline can be transformed into workable administrative practices . . . .”); Reuel E. 
Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal 
Administrative Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399, 419-21 (2007) (explaining the central 
role of agency expertise in defining the deferential judicial role in administrative 
law). 
272. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1545 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that 
DOC officials do not deserve deference when they lack expertise and fail to seek 
expert assistance). 
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Even when states are ordered to reform flawed procedures, they sometimes 
adopt half-measures that purport to fix real problems but in fact do no such 
thing and, thus, compound the lack of transparency. As noted above, one trial 
court found that North Carolina needed to revise its protocol to provide an an-
esthesiologist to monitor the inmate.273 The state responded by buying a BIS 
monitor.274 The state’s action created the impression that it was addressing the 
problem, but anesthesiologists agree that BIS monitors should only be used in 
conjunction with, not instead of, other methods.275 Indeed, the BIS monitor is 
only useful if it is interpreted by a medical professional with training in anesthe-
sia, which North Carolina did not employ.276 By purchasing a BIS monitor, 
then, North Carolina only appeared to address the trial court’s concern that the 
inmate may be insufficiently anesthetized. As Professor Denno argues, its objec-
tive was to approve a new protocol quickly as opposed to addressing the old 
procedure’s real problems.277 Yet, the illusion was convincing enough that the 
Fourth Circuit, without comment, let the execution proceed.278 Moreover, this 
illusion furthered the political process failure by creating the false impression 
that the state was carefully adjusting its procedure to mitigate dangers coming 
to light.  
Even a state’s use of pancuronium to paralyze inmates contributes to the 
political process failure, as it creates the appearance of serenity, even where 
there is a torturous death.279 As a result, legislators and other state officials are 
far less likely to recognize problems that need to be corrected. Similarly, wit-
nesses at executions usually report that the inmate died serenely.280 Pan-
 
273. See Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06-CT-3018, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 
2006). 
274. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text. 
275. See Third Affidavit of Dr. Heath at 4, Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06-CT-3018 (E.D.N.C. 
Apr. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Third Heath Affidavit] (“It is virtually universally ac-
cepted and understood by all anesthesiologists that the BIS monitor and other 
brain function monitors cannot be used as the sole method for assessing anes-
thetic depth.”); Robert Steinbrook, New Technology, Old Dilemma—Monitoring 
EEG Activity During Executions, 354 New Eng. J. Med. 2525, 2526 (2006). 
276. Third Heath Affidavit, supra note 275, at 3. 
277. Denno, Quandary, supra note 28, at 119. 
278. See Brown v. Beck, 445 F.3d 752, 752 (4th Cir. 2006). Such half-hearted reforms are 
hardly limited to the States discussed in the text. See, e.g., Denno, Quandary, supra 
note 28, at 101 (“Florida’s nonexistent turnaround time in creating a revised pro-
tocol implicates the State’s lack of care and consideration of its execution proc-
ess.”); id. at 100 (explaining that Ohio did not adopt changes it promised follow-
ing a botched execution). 
279. See, e.g., Beyea, supra note 22, at 603; Koniaris et al., supra note 22, at 1414. 
280. See, e.g., Adam Buckman, Ted Koppel Saw a Man Executed and Thought . . . How 
Humane, How Painless, How Easy, How Simple . . . It Should Be Shown on TV, N.Y. 
Post, June 10, 2001, at 113 (“[W]hen it was over, I was shocked and horrified that 
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curonium thus creates a false impression about the procedure’s safety that is 
difficult to dispel. The resulting misconceptions make it less likely that a state 
legislature or even DOC would bother revising the procedure; why would gov-
ernment officials fix something that few people perceive is broken?281  
From this perspective, pancuronium not only protects this particular 
method of lethal injection from attack but also helps preserve the death penalty 
itself. The general public pays little attention to lethal injection procedures, in 
part because they usually appear uneventful. One might surmise that if the pro-
cedure did not appear peaceful—if all inmates were to convulse and gasp as 
Diaz did—public support for the death penalty might suffer.282 As with certain 
kinds of speech restrictions, judicial intervention here could be viewed more as 
correcting political process failures rather than substantive meddling.283 Were 
the pancuronium to minimize the risk of pain or even hasten death, its inclu-
sion in the protocol might be justifiable, but it does not.284 As Justice Stevens 
argued, states’ asserted interest in “preserving the dignity of the procedure” is 
“woefully inadequate” and “vastly outweighed by the risk that the inmate is ac-
tually experiencing excruciating pain that no one can detect.”285 
 
it had been so clinical and so smooth and so easy and that I was less affected by it 
than I feared I would be.”); Dara Kam, Victim’s Parents Watch Killer Die, Palm 
Beach Post, July 2, 2008, at 1-A (describing an inmate “slip[] away tranquilly”); 
Brian Witte, Triple Murderer in Maryland Executed After Supreme Court Rejects 
Last-Ditch Appeals, Associated Press Wire, June 18, 2004 (“Witnesses described 
the procedure . . . as peaceful and uneventful.”). 
281. Misconceptions about the safety’s procedure also need to be overcome by plain-
tiffs litigating these claims. Even the most fair-minded judges are skeptical that a 
seemingly peaceful death is potentially torturous. See Fogel, supra note 154, at 736 
(recounting by the judge that, when he first was assigned a lethal injection case, 
his immediate reaction was “extremely skeptical”). 
282. Of course, it is impossible to say precisely how public attitudes towards the death 
penalty would change, but grotesque convulsions probably would affect at least 
some people’s views. 
283. Cf. Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Con-
stitution 3-16 (2006) (proposing that the judicial role is to interpret the Consti-
tution to further “active liberty” and to intervene most readily during political 
process failures); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Ju-
dicial Review 111 (1980) (“Where the evil the state is seeking to avert is one that 
is thought to arise from the particular dangers of the message being conveyed . . . 
the hazards of political distortion and judicial acquiescence are at their peak.”). 
284. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1543 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 
the Baze trial court). 
285. Id. at 1544 (Stevens, J., concurring). In other words, the “dignity of the procedure” 
should not constitute a “legitimate penological justification,” see id. at 1532 (plu-
rality opinion), for refusing to adopt an alternative method in the face of docu-
mented advantages over the status quo. 
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Given experts’ general agreement that the three-drug protocol as imple-
mented in many states poses unnecessary risks of pain, the question must be 
asked why states cling so stubbornly the status quo.286 It is impossible to answer 
this question with certainty, but I can speculate. Perhaps some state officials do 
not like being told what to do, and their reflexive impulse is to litigate rather 
than reform. Perhaps some want death row inmates to suffer a painful death 
and even believe there is a democratic mandate for that position.287 More likely, 
perhaps officials fear that if they change their procedure, inmates will simply 
challenge the new method, resulting in endless rounds of litigation.288 Along 
similar lines, in some states, officials may fear that a changed procedure would 
require time-consuming legislative revision.289 Another possibility is that state 
officials, like most people, do not like giving too much thought to killing peo-
ple. Some executioners, in fact, have admitted that their role in executions has 
taken a significant psychological toll.290 
Whatever the reasons, some states have failed to engage carefully with the 
complicated procedure they put in place. This failure, of course, creates the risk 
that condemned inmates will die an excruciating death, but it also raises serious 
concerns about how government behaves when it acts outside public view. The 
collective abrogation of responsibility—elected officials’ utter inattention to the 
protocol’s design; the delegation to unelected, unqualified personnel; the lack of 
transparency and related preference for illusory fixes over real revisions; the re-
fusal to seek expert advice—amounts to a serious political process failure merit-
ing judicial attention. As Justice Stevens argued in his Baze concurrence, “[i]n 
the majority of States that use the three-drug protocol, the drugs were selected 
by unelected Department of Correction officials with no specialized medical 
 
286. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 876 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (noting that the 
State’s expert, Dershwitz, recommended the one-drug protocol); Deposition of 
Dr. Mark Dershwitz at 52-53, 277-79, Jackson v. Danberg, 06-300 (D. Del. Sept. 10, 
2007) (reporting from the State’s expert that a one-drug protocol would impose 
less risk on the condemned than a three-drug protocol); infra Subsection IV.A.1. 
Dr. Dershwitz’s opinions in favor of the one-drug protocol are especially signifi-
cant because he has testified consistently as the States’ expert. 
287. See, e.g., Robert Blecker, But Did They Listen? The New Jersey Death Penalty Com-
mission’s Exercise in Abolitionism: A Reply, 5 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 9, 25 
(2007) (arguing that the retributive justification for the death penalty “inflicts jus-
tified pain upon a person who earlier inflicted unjustified pain”). 
288. But see supra notes 194-197 and accompanying text. 
289. For instance, in some states, the use of a paralytic in combination with a barbitu-
rate is prescribed by statute, so a change in procedure would require legislative ac-
tion. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-617 (2009); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-51 
(2008); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1014 (West 2008). 
290. See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that 
one execution team member was diagnosed and disabled with post-traumatic 
stress disorder and found his experience on the execution team to be “the most 
stressful responsibility a prison employee ever could have”). 
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knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or guidance. As such, 
their drug selections are not entitled to the kind of deference afforded legislative 
decisions.”291 Quite simply, the states’ practices do not deserve judicial defer-
ence where, as here, “they are the product of ‘administrative convenience’ and a 
‘stereotyped reaction’ to an issue, rather than a careful analysis of relevant con-
siderations favoring or disfavoring a conclusion.”292 
Despite all these problems, courts both explicitly and implicitly treat these 
procedures as the province of the political branches and immune from judicial 
meddling. This approach is misguided, because some states consistently have 
proven unwilling and unable to engage with the details of their own procedures. 
As Professor Chayes explained, although public law litigation can be intrusive in 
that it commands affirmative action of political officers, it ordinarily merely ad-
justs the manner in which policy is carried forward. In this regard, its target is 
generally administrative rather than legislative, focusing on areas where usual 
political processes have failed.293 Such failure, Chayes observes, is more likely 
where the victims are prisoners or inmates of mental institutions, literally disen-
franchised persons with no access to normal legislative processes.294 Death row 
inmates, whatever one thinks of them, have no access “to the levers of power in 
the system”295 and yet bear the entire burden of the political process failures that 
have resulted in a broken process.  
Indeed, death row inmates’ lack of political power helps explain the politi-
cal process failure here. In part because inmates lack power, states have de-
signed their procedures with primary attention to other interests, such as execu-
 
291. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1545 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
292. Id. 
293. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1281, 1315 (1976). 
294. Id.; see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (sug-
gesting that laws burdening “discrete and insular minorities” require a higher 
level of judicial scrutiny); Fiss, supra note 198, at 6 (discussing Carolene Products 
footnote 4 and arguing that judicial involvement is particularly appropriate when 
there is legislative failure such as the victimization of a discrete and insular minor-
ity). 
295. Chayes, supra note 293, at 1315; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in 
Authoritarian Institutions, 32 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 441, 459 (1999) (“Those in the 
military, in prisons, and in schools are classic discrete and insular minorities, who 
have little political power.”); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote 
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn 
About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079 (1993) (offering a pub-
lic choice critique of why legislatures fail to attend to the rights of those in the 
criminal justice system); James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act: A “Not Exactly,” Equal Protection Analysis, 37 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 105, 157 (2000) (arguing that prisoners as a class should be treated as a “dis-
crete and insular minority”). 
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tioner anonymity and the witnesses’ experience.296 These are legitimate inter-
ests, but, unlike the inmate’s interest in a painless execution, they are not con-
stitutional interests. Of course, courts often consider non-constitutional inter-
ests in striking the proper balance for a constitutional rule,297 but where the 
right-holder (in this case, the condemned) lacks access “to the levers of power” 
and where the state practice threatening the constitutional right is the result of 
serious political process failures, courts should not automatically defer to non-
constitutional interests over constitutional ones. Excessive judicial deference is 
even more troubling here, because modest revisions could yield much safer pro-
tocols.298 In other words, where the right-holder seeks changes that would place 
a minor burden on the state and yet yield significant protection to the constitu-
tional right, non-constitutional interests should not trump constitutional ones 
absent extraordinary circumstances not present here.  
Given many lethal injection states’ failings, there is a lack of an effective al-
ternative to judicial intervention.299 Writing about Taylor v. Crawford, Judge 
Gaitan explained that he knew he would need to intervene when he realized that 
the state, contrary to his initial assumptions, had taken no reasonable measures 
in designing the procedure.300 Interrelated institutional concerns such as feder-
alism, separation of powers, and judicial competence are certainly important 
and legitimate, but not when judges invoke them to avoid confronting constitu-
tional problems that will otherwise be ignored because the state actors have ab-
dicated their responsibilities, concealed the details of the relevant policy, and 
applied that policy to a population lacking political power.301 Again, in the 
normal operation of divided government, norms of judicial restraint serve as 
crucial checks on judicial power, but, when taken too far, they inhibit judges 
from redressing violations of constitutional norms even when the political 
 
296. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
297. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
298. See infra Part IV. 
299. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 217, at 1422 (arguing that constitutional 
remedies are most justified by the “absence of effective alternatives”). 
300. Judge Gaitan explained he had assumed “first, that the state of Missouri had a 
written execution protocol; second, that it had been subjected to due diligence be-
fore implementation; third, that this protocol was approved by either the legisla-
tive and/or executive (Department of Corrections) branches of the Missouri gov-
ernment; and fourth, that trained medical personnel implemented it properly and 
consistently. None of these assumptions proved to be true.” Gaitan, supra note 
115, at 765. 
301. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Con-
stitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1217-18 (1978) (arguing that federal courts 
are sometimes overly concerned with institutional concerns such as federalism 
and separation of powers and therefore are inhibited from redressing constitu-
tional violations). But see Levinson, supra note 117, at 924 (arguing that, under 
Sager’s theory, all constitutional rights are under-enforced). 
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process cannot be trusted to do so. Of course, the political process failures re-
counted here do not amount to a constitutional violation, but they do belie ar-
guments that courts should defer to the political branches in these cases.302  
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that courts’ deference to the political 
branches is particularly problematic in the Eighth Amendment context, because 
the Eighth Amendment’s legal standard explicitly incorporates other states’ 
practices.303 Judicial deference to the political branches in an Eighth Amend-
ment case, then, actually encourages those political process failures to perpetu-
ate elsewhere. Confronted with a decision about whether to revise its execution 
procedure, a state is likely to copy the common practice rather than to study the 
relative merits of the options. Consequently, courts’ unwillingness to confront 
the shoddy legislative and administrative procedures by which lethal injection 
has been adopted greatly compounds the political process problem, because it 
becomes more likely that other states will merely mimic a procedure that, al-
though carelessly adopted, has already received court approval.304  
 
IV. The Modesty of Lethal Injection Remedies 
 
The failed political processes of many states, then, give good reason for ju-
dicial intervention. This Part explores the related issue of why that intervention 
would be modest and not overly intrusive. Section A discusses particular reme-
dies that courts could impose. In light of these available remedies, Section B ar-
gues that courts’ general reluctance to reach the remedial stage in lethal injec-
tion actions is misplaced, because these remedies are modest and respectful of 
the states. Judicial deference is, therefore, inappropriate—not just because of 
 
302. See Fletcher, supra note 202, at 694 (“The only legitimate basis for a federal judge 
to take over the political function in devising or choosing a remedy in an institu-
tional suit is the demonstrated unwillingness or incapacity of the political body.”). 
303. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (noting “that it is difficult to regard a 
practice as ‘objectively intolerable’ when it is in fact widely tolerated”). 
304. One could argue that the prevalence of a given procedure should instead cut in 
favor of additional judicial deference, especially given the Eighth Amendment’s 
incorporation of common practices. See id. But even if headcounting retains an 
important place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it should not substitute for 
review of a method’s safety. To allow a mere headcount of states to confirm the 
constitutionality of a painful practice would effectively deny plaintiffs the benefit 
of new evidence, suggesting that methods once thought safe are now understood 
to cause pain. To this extent, “evolving standards of decency,” see Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citation omitted), must include more than the day’s 
most common practice. Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) 
(“‘[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be 
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the 
Eighth Amendment.’” (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002))), with 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (“The clearest and most reliable objec-
tive evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures.”). 
Article - Eric Berger - 28 - Production - 2009.05.15.doc 5/15/2009 1:00 PM 
LETHAL INJECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES  
 315 
the aforementioned political process failures, but also because of the relative 
modesty of the potential remedies.  
 
A. Remedial Options 
 
Should a court find that a lethal injection procedure runs afoul of the 
Eighth Amendment, it would have a substantial number of remedial possibili-
ties from which to choose. For the judge in this position, these options are, of 
course, worth examining. But because courts determine the scope of the right in 
light of potential remedies, judges should also think about the remedial options 
at the outset of the case. It is, therefore, worth emphasizing that the remedial 
alternatives discussed here would not require wholesale revisions of existing 
procedures but rather modest adjustments, which would allow states to keep 
much of their existing processes in place.  
 
1. Affirmative Injunctions 
 
Affirmative injunctions order the offending government or official to take 
specific action to correct the violation. They are, therefore, generally seen as 
more intrusive than negative injunctions, which instead forbid the actor from 
continuing the unconstitutional practice. Whereas the negative injunction 
leaves it to government officials to decide how to correct the violation, affirma-
tive injunctions dictate precise measures the officials must take.305  
Affirmative injunctions, though, have their advantages and have been used 
recently by some courts finding Eight Amendment violations.306 In states where 
officials have purported to correct flawed procedures by adopting inadequate, 
superficial revisions, an affirmative injunction may actually better serve the 
state’s interest, because it provides concrete requirements and potentially expe-
dites the creation of a constitutional procedure with which the state can resume 
executions.  
There are two especially feasible lethal injection affirmative injunctions: (1) 
the one-drug protocol and (2) anesthesiologist monitoring. The one-drug pro-
tocol would replace the current three-drug procedure with a single, massive 
dose of a barbiturate like pentobarbital. (Experts agree that pentobarbital is a 
 
305. See Fletcher, supra note 202, at 649-54 (discussing affirmative and negative injunc-
tions). 
306. Though affirmative injunctions have been historically disfavored, the distinction 
between negative and affirmative injunctions has less practical importance today, 
given courts’ willingness to grant affirmative decrees where some injunctive relief 
is warranted. Id. at 649-50; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 225, at 1067-73 (de-
scribing new “experimentalist tendency” in courts’ approach to public law reme-
dies). Additionally, to the extent that Baze requires the plaintiff to proffer an al-
ternative, see Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532, the plurality contemplates that a court 
finding a violation could affirmatively order that that alternative be implemented. 
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better suited barbiturate for lethal injection than thiopental.307) The major ad-
vantage of a one-drug procedure is that it would eliminate the possibility of ex-
cruciating pain.308 Whereas the barbiturate in the three-drug procedure theo-
retically anesthetizes the inmate so that he will not suffer pain from the other 
drugs, in a one-drug protocol, the barbiturate is the only drug. Even if some-
thing goes wrong, the inmate will not experience pain, because barbiturates do 
not cause pain. Of course, even a one-drug procedure would need to be prop-
erly administered, but the procedure would be much easier to administer and 
the consequences of maladministration far less severe. In short, the one-drug 
procedure significantly reduces both the chance of error and the pain suffered 
in the event of error without requiring many other changes from the state.  
Some courts have already recognized the one-drug protocol’s advantages. 
The district court in Morales offered it as one of two possible remedies from 
which California could choose.309 In Harbison, the trial court faulted Tennessee 
for not taking more seriously its own committee’s recommendation of a one-
drug procedure.310 And, most recently, an Ohio state court found that Ohio’s 
three-drug procedure failed to comply with the state’s statutory requirement 
that lethal injection be completed “quickly and painlessly” and ordered that the 
state’s “protocol employ the use . . . of a single, anesthetic drug.”311  
A switch to the one-drug procedure would also not unduly burden states. 
States would have to make minor adjustments to accommodate the one-drug 
approach, but in so doing, they would greatly simplify executions. Such a 
 
307. See, e.g., Hankins v. Quarterman, No. 4:04-cv-875-Y, 2007 WL 959040, at *20 
(N.D. Tex. 2007) (citing expert testimony that a long-acting pentobarbital is the 
preferred barbiturate in veterinary euthanasia); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 
972, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing pentobarbital as the preferable drug for the one-
drug protocol); Amy L. Mottor, Note, Morales and Taylor: The Future of Lethal 
Injection, 6 Appalachian J.L. 287, 307 (2007) (discussing the advantages of pen-
tobarbital); Susi Vassallo, Thiopental in Lethal Injection, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
957, 960-67 (2008) (discussing the disadvantages of thiopental). 
308. See, e.g., Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 879 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (“No 
medical testimony supports the proposition that the one-drug protocol causes 
any suffering . . . .”); Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (“[R]emoval of [pancurium 
bromide and potassium chloride] from the lethal-injection protocol, with the exe-
cution accomplished solely by an anesthetic, such as sodium pentobarbital, would 
eliminate any constitutional concerns, subject only to the implementation of ade-
quate, verifiable procedures to ensure that the inmate actually receives a fatal 
dose.”); Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 19, at 956 (anesthesiologists arguing 
that a large dose of barbiturate poses “no risk whatsoever” of pain). 
309. See Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (giving the 
State the option of using “only sodium thiopental or another barbiturate or com-
bination of barbiturates in Plaintiff’s execution”). 
310. See Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 896; see also supra notes 265-269 and accompany-
ing text. 
311. Ohio v. Rivera, No. 04-65940, slip op. at 9 (Lorain County Ct. June 10, 2008). 
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change would result in a safer, more easily administered procedure that would 
probably require less training and practice. Moreover, most states would not 
need to change their execution facilities or basic drug delivery systems.312  
Notwithstanding these obvious advantages, Baze does somewhat compli-
cate the matter. Although no Justice questioned the central point that the one-
drug procedure is painless, some justices did raise concerns about it. Justice 
Alito pointed to one commentator suggesting that it is difficult to kill someone 
using a barbiturate and that a small percentage of such attempts resulted in 
“problems with completion.”313 Three separate opinions also noted that a mus-
cle relaxant or paralytic is often used for lawfully assisted euthanasia in the 
Netherlands, thereby suggesting that the inclusion of pancuronium was defen-
sible and possibly even desirable.314  
These concerns do not foreclose the one-drug procedure so much as indi-
cate that trial court factual findings would be needed before it could be judi-
cially imposed. Given that the Baze record contained minimal evidence about 
the relative merits of the one-drug approach,315 the Justices’ comments on it 
were dicta. Moreover, Justice Alito’s concern that a single barbiturate had failed 
to kill a tiny percentage of euthanasia patients in the Netherlands is scant reason 
to reject this alternative.316 When euthanasia patients fail to die from the ad-
ministration of a single barbiturate, it is because the drug has been improperly 
administered; properly administered, a large enough dose of a barbiturate will 
be fatal.317 In effect, Justice Alito is merely pointing out that a one-drug protocol 
could be improperly administered. He fails to explain, however, that the three-
drug protocol can also be maladministered and with far graver consequences. 
He also fails to point out that by removing the second and third drugs, the state 
would be simplifying the procedure and minimizing the risk of problems of any 
sort. Similarly, he does not note that the largest thiopental dose used in the 
Netherlands is often only two grams, and that it is therefore not surprising that 
 
312. By way of contrast, even though carbon monoxide poisoning would probably be 
another painless alternative, see Gaitan, supra note 115, in most states it likely 
would require a new airtight facility and therefore probably would be more intru-
sive and expensive. 
313. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1541 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring). 
314. Id. at 1535 (plurality opinion); id. at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1566 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
315. See id. at 1534 (explaining that one-drug protocol was not proposed to state courts 
below). 
316. See id. at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that 5 out of 535 patients woke up). 
317. See, e.g., Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 879 n.4 (“No medical testimony supports the 
proposition that the one-drug protocol causes any suffering or that it prolongs the 
pronouncement of death.”); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (noting that execution by anesthetic like pentobarbital need only ensure 
that the inmate “actually receives a fatal dose”). 
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such use was not always lethal.318 Finally, Justice Alito also fails to explain that 
were an inmate to survive an initial dose of a barbiturate, the contingency plan 
would simply be to administer another dose.319 The possibility that a painless 
drug would need to be re-administered in a small fraction of cases is hardly a 
sound reason not to use that method to replace an approach that creates a real 
risk of excruciating pain.  
The Justices’ discussion of the one-drug procedure also glosses over some 
important distinctions. In particular, the comparison to euthanasia in the Neth-
erlands is inapposite, because it is a different kind of procedure from lethal in-
jection. Crucially, doctors take part in euthanasia in the Netherlands.320 It is, 
therefore, far more likely in the Netherlands that any pain masked by the pan-
curonium would be detected.321 By way of contrast, laypersons frequently ad-
minister American lethal injection procedures, and they are incapable of mak-
ing such detections. Moreover, even where doctors are present during 
executions, they usually watch from an adjacent room and would not be able to 
detect pain from that distance. Additionally, Dutch euthanasia does not include 
the use of potassium chloride, which is the three-drug protocol’s painful chemi-
cal. The use of pancuronium in the Netherlands, therefore, poses far less danger 
of masking excruciating pain.  
Of course, for a court to impose a one-drug protocol as a remedy, signifi-
cant evidence of that procedure’s advantages and disadvantages would need to 
be developed at trial, and it is possible that problems will become more appar-
ent. But assuming that current experts’ preference for the one-drug protocol 
continues to appear well-founded, this alternative offers courts an affirmative 
injunction that greatly reduces the risk of pain and simultaneously makes the 
state’s job easier. 
 
318. Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 19, at 954. 
319. Cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (holding that it is 
not cruel and unusual punishment to attempt to execute a person after the first 
execution attempt failed); Alper, supra note 29, at 836 (explaining the second-dose 
contingency plan in animal euthanasia). 
320. See Agnes van der Heide et al., End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands Under the 
Euthanasia Act, 356 New Eng. J. Med. 1957, 1958 (2007) (“In the Netherlands, 
euthanasia is defined as death resulting from medication that is administered by a 
physician with the explicit intention of hastening death at the explicit request of 
the patient.”). Assisted suicide, in which patients self-administer fatal drugs pre-
scribed by a physician, also exists in the Netherlands but is far less common. Id. at 
1958-61. 
321. Justice Alito also neglects to mention that the same expert he cites to argue that 
American doctors lack experience killing people with an overdose of a barbiturate 
states in the same article that the use of a paralytic like pancuronium is “com-
pletely inappropriate” in executions. Compare Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1541 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (discussing views of Dr. Truog), with Gawande at al., supra note 25, at 
448 (Dr. Truog discussing, inter alia, dangers of pancuronium in lethal injection). 
Article - Eric Berger - 28 - Production - 2009.05.15.doc 5/15/2009 1:00 PM 
LETHAL INJECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES  
 319 
Courts could also order an anesthesiologist to monitor the inmate’s anes-
thetic depth. This monitoring was what Judge Gaitan initially ordered in Mis-
souri and one of the two options Judge Fogel presented to California.322 The 
major advantage of this remedy is that in one step it protects the inmate from 
other errors that might occur.323 We know that the three-drug protocol is 
painless if the inmate is properly anesthetized but excruciating if he is not. 
Various problems discussed above can result in insufficient anesthesia. But if an 
anesthesiologist monitors the inmate’s anesthetic depth, then any such problem 
can be detected and corrected before the pancuronium and potassium chloride 
are injected. The requirement that an anesthesiologist monitor anesthetic 
depth, therefore, obviates the need for more intrusive instructions regarding the 
various steps of the procedure.  
There are, however, some complications. Due to medical ethics, it may not 
be easy for some states to find an anesthesiologist or nurse anesthetist willing to 
play such a substantial role in execution procedures.324 In fact, the American 
Medical Association (AMA), the Society of Correctional Physicians, and the 
American Nurses Association have all adopted statements that doctors or 
nurses should not participate in executions.325 The sentiments reflected by these 
associations, unsurprisingly, make it difficult for states to find willing anesthesi-
ologists. California ran into this problem when the two anesthesiologists who 
had agreed to participate in the Morales execution balked after discovering the 
significant role they had been assigned.326 Along similar lines, following Judge 
Gaitan’s ruling, Missouri insisted (just days after sending out cold-call letters to 
some Missouri anesthesiologists) that it “is unable to comply with the Court’s 
 
322. See Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Taylor v. 
Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8-9 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006), certi-
fying questions to 457 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 487 F. 3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2047 (2008). 
323. This advantage assumes that the anesthesiologist is competent and actually moni-
tors the inmate’s anesthetic depth, and that he would delay the administration of 
the second and third chemicals if the inmate were insufficiently anesthetized by 
the thiopental. 
324. Most experts agree that a nurse anesthetist would possess the training necessary to 
monitor the inmate’s anesthetic depth. See, e.g., Heath Declaration at 15, Walker v. 
Epps, No. 07-176 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 22, 2007) (anesthesiologist explaining that anes-
thesia can be administered by anesthesiologists and Certified Registered Nurse 
Anesthetists). For ease of presentation, this Article refers to them collectively as 
“anesthesiologists.” 
325. Gawande, supra note 52, at 136; see, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Af-
fairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Med. Ethics: Current Opinions with An-
notationS § 2.06 (2005) [hereinafter AMA Code of Med. Ethics]. 
326. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
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direction to obtain and use a board certified anesthesiologist in its execution 
process.”327  
While the restraint imposed by medical ethics is a substantial concern, it is 
not an insurmountable one. Although many doctors will not take part in execu-
tions, such ethics rules are typically not legally binding.328 Doctors, therefore, 
can depart from certain ethical guidelines without risking their licenses or other 
disciplinary measures.329 As the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
itself puts it, “ethical obligations typically exceed legal duties. In some cases, the 
law mandates unethical conduct.”330  
From the AMA’s perspective, capital punishment law does mandate un-
ethical conduct. Notwithstanding ethical concerns, many states want a medical 
presence during executions. Thirty-five of the thirty-eight death penalty states 
allow physician participation in executions, seventeen require it, and only two 
(Kentucky and Illinois) explicitly forbid it.331 To protect participating physicians 
from license challenges for violating ethics codes, states usually promise ano-
nymity and provide legal immunity for such challenges.332 In fact, in at least one 
state with a law permitting physician participation in executions, the state 
medical board upheld against a challenge the license of a physician known to 
have participated in executions precisely because state law permitted that par-
ticipation.333 Similarly, in North Carolina, a state court ruled that the North 
Carolina Medical Board cannot punish physicians for participating in execu-
 
327. Defendants’ 7/14/2006 Submission at 4, Taylor (No. 05-4173). 
328. See, e.g., AMA Code of Med. Ethics, supra note 325, at xv (“The following Prin-
ciples adopted by the American Medical Association are not laws, but standards of 
conduct which define the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician.”). 
329. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 52, at 132. Moreover, while the former president of 
the American Society of Anesthesiologists advised anesthesiologists to “steer 
clear” of executions, his words are, by his own account, advice only and lack any 
binding effect. See Dr. Orin F. Guidry, President, American Society of Anesthesi-
ologists, Observations Regarding Lethal Injection (June 30, 2006), 
http://www.asahq.org/news/asanews063006.htm. 
330. AMA Code of Med. Ethics, supra note 325, § 1.02. 
331. Gawande, supra note 52, at 151; see also Neil Farber et al., Physicians’ Attitudes 
About Involvement in Lethal Injection for Capital Punishment, 160 Archives of 
Internal Med. 2912, 2913 (2000) (noting that states involve physicians in various 
ways such as providing technical advice, ordering drugs, supervising drug admini-
stration, and pronouncing death); Christopher J. Levy, Conflict of Duty: Capital 
Punishment Regulations and AMA Medical Ethics, 26 J. Legal Med. 261, 264 
(2005). 
332. Gawande, supra note 52, at 136. Although the identities of some doctors like Do-
erhoff are sometimes discovered anyway, see Kohler, supra note 42, no doctor has 
yet lost a license for participation in an execution, see Gawande, supra note 52, at 
137. 
333. See Gawande, supra note 52, at 142. 
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tions.334 This ruling makes sense. Even if state statutory law incorporates medi-
cal ethics’ rules regarding “professional conduct,”335 a more specific statutory 
provision allowing physician participation in executions must trump more gen-
eral ethical rules.336  
Indeed, many doctors do not see medical ethics as a bar to their involve-
ment in executions. Studies demonstrate that 25% of physicians would person-
ally perform five or more steps of a lethal injection procedure, and 19% would 
be willing to administer the lethal drugs themselves.337 One anesthesiologist 
stated at a panel of the American Society of Anesthesiologists that he considered 
it an ethical duty to assist with lethal injection because prisoners “are suffering 
 
334. See N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Board, No. 07-3574, slip op. at 4-5 (N.C. Su-
per. Ct. Div. Sept. 21, 2007) (holding that the medical board improperly sought to 
discipline a doctor for conduct “specifically authorized and required by law”). 
335. Many state codes vaguely prohibit doctors’ “unprofessional conduct.” See, e.g., 
Ala. Code § 34-24-360(2) (2007) (stipulating that credential to practice in health 
care may be revoked for “unprofessional conduct”); Ark. Code Ann. § 17-95-409 
(2007) (same); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24 § 1731 (2008) (same); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-
178(23) (2005) (same). 
336. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738-39 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (citing “rudimentary” principle of statutory construction that “the spe-
cific governs the general”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 
UCLA L. Rev. 621, 663 (1990) (describing Scalia’s argument in Jett as mainstream 
statutory interpretation). 
  It is also possible that a doctor’s national certifying board, such as the Ameri-
can Board of Anesthesiology (ABA), could seek to suspend certification for a doc-
tor who participated in executions. Whereas state licensing is required for a doc-
tor to practice medicine in a particular state, board certification is a voluntary 
process and is awarded to doctors by a national board in an individual specialty. 
See American Board of Medical Specialties, Board Certification Editorial Back-
ground 4-5 (Sept. 4, 2007), available at http://www.abms.org/news_and_events/  
media_newsroom/pdf/abms_editorialbackground.pdf). However, not all hospitals 
require board certification for anesthesiologists wishing to practice at that institu-
tion, Outcome Assessment in Advanced Practice Nursing 246 (Ruth M. 
Kleinpell, ed. 2001). Additionally, because the ABA’s disciplinary procedures 
commence with a referral from a state medical board, see The American Board 
of Anesthesiology, Inc., Booklet of Information §§ 5.02, 5.06 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.theaba.org/pdf/BOI-2008.pdf, cases like North Carolina Medi-
cal Board make it unlikely that the ABA would sanction a doctor whom the State 
medical board has not already disciplined. It is therefore doubtful that the hypo-
thetical threat of suspended certification would make it much more difficult for a 
state to find an anesthesiologist to participate. 
337. Neil J. Farber et al., Physicians’ Willingness To Participate in the Process of Lethal 
Injection for Capital Punishment, 135(10) Annals Intern Med. 884, 884-88 (2001); 
see also Denno, Paradox, supra note 28, at 115 (explaining that physicians do par-
ticipate in executions). 
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and I have the ability to help them.”338 Nurses appear even more willing to par-
ticipate.339 One state nursing board even permitted a nurse in that state to par-
ticipate in executions so long as he did not actually push the plunger delivering 
the drugs.340  
It is, therefore, unsurprising that Missouri recently belied its earlier repre-
sentations that it was impossible to find an anesthesiologist to take part in its 
lethal injection procedure and represented that it has found one.341 Assuming 
that this anesthesiologist is competent and will in fact monitor the inmate’s an-
esthetic depth and intervene if necessary,342 this development is significant, ef-
fectively setting a new standard of care for lethal injection. Moreover, other 
states could solicit this same doctor’s assistance for their own procedures.343 Of 
course, this remedy would not be available in Kentucky and Illinois, which for-
bid physician participation, but those states are in the significant minority.344 
Where available, this remedy is simple and un-intrusive. It permits a state to 
keep the same procedure but for the addition of one safeguard.345 And, in the 
grand scheme of things, it also would not be terribly expensive.346  
 
338. Clinical Forum: Medicalizing Executions Places Anesthesiologists on Slippery Slope, 
ASA Daily News 2006, Oct. 15, 2006, available at http://www.asadailynews.com/ 
Sunday.html. 
339. See, e.g., Brown v. Beck, 445 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting the participation 
of a nurse in North Carolina’s procedure); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 
979 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting the same in California); Evans v. Saar, 412 F. Supp. 
2d 519, 525 (D. Md. 2006) (noting the same in Maryland); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 
05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *1-3 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (noting the same in 
Missouri). 
340. Gawande, supra note 52, at 147. 
341. See Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ 
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Compelling Discovery at 3, Clemons v. 
Crawford No. 07-4129 (W.D. Mo. May 1, 2008). 
342. The state’s filing announcing the development was vague on the details. See id. 
343. It is not uncommon for personnel participating in one state’s execution proce-
dure to join another state’s team. Dr. Doerhoff, for example, participated on the 
federal and Arizona lethal injection teams even after Judge Gaitan had barred his 
participation in Missouri. See Kiefer, supra note 255; Weinstein, Doctors Barred, 
supra note 255. 
344. See, e.g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/119-5(d-5) (West 2008) (“The Department of Cor-
rections shall not request, require, or allow a health care practitioner licensed in 
Illinois, including but not limited to physicians and nurses, regardless of employ-
ment, to participate in an execution.”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.220(3) (West 
2008). 
345. Of course, states with multiple, serious problems with their procedures should 
correct them, but the addition of an anesthesiologist would not require as close 
judicial scrutiny of each of those steps. 
346. See infra notes 368-373 and accompanying text. 
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While there is much to be said in favor of this alternative, Baze again pre-
sents an obstacle. Even though ethical guidelines typically lack binding author-
ity, the Baze plurality and Justice Alito’s concurrence effectively treated them as 
mandatory.347 The justices overstated the case. First, Baze considered the proto-
col in Kentucky, one of only two states that have barred physician participation. 
Its comments on this topic, then, should be considered dictum in the thirty-five 
jurisdictions that permit physician involvement. Second, while the majority of 
the medical establishment does oppose physician involvement in executions, 
some doctors obviously are willing to participate.348 Third, as North Carolina 
Medical Board demonstrates, medical associations’ ethical opinions cannot 
trump contrary state law, and states, with court assistance, also shield their exe-
cution team members’ identities from the public.349 In short, an anesthesiolo-
gist’s participation is a feasible remedy that would cure most of the three-drug 
protocol’s dangers with little intrusion into the state’s affairs.350  
 
2. Negative Injunctions 
 
Even if there are good reasons to impose an affirmative injunction, courts 
are often reluctant to order a state to take a specific course of action.351 By con-
 
347. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1536 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he American 
Society of Anesthesiologists’ own ethical guidelines prohibit anesthesiologists 
from participating in capital punishment.”) (internal citations omitted); see also 
id. at 1539-40 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that other medical associations’ 
guidelines prohibit or discourage participation in executions). 
348. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 52, at 150 (describing views of a doctor who knew 
AMA position but felt doctors have an ethical obligation to ensure condemned 
inmates are without pain in their dying moments); David Waisel, Physician Par-
ticipation in Capital Punishment, 82 Mayo Clinical Proc. 1073 (2007). 
349. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 52, at 131 (noting that Morales district court agreed 
to help California maintain anesthesiologists’ anonymity in response to ethical 
concerns). Whether the government should subvert the ethical principles of 
medical associations is, of course, another matter. See id. at 152 (arguing that soci-
ety is worse off from such subversion); Jonathan I. Groner, The Hippocratic Para-
dox: The Role of the Medical Profession in Capital Punishment in the United States, 
35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 883, 905 (2008) (arguing that the “individual physician 
harms his or her relationships with other patients by participating in an execu-
tion”). 
350. If a court were to order this remedy and the State were to demonstrate that, de-
spite a good-faith effort, it had failed to find an anesthesiologist willing to partici-
pate, the court could always order an alternative remedy, such as a negative in-
junction or the one-drug protocol. Given Missouri’s experience, though, it seems 
likely that a state making a good-faith effort would be able to find an anesthesi-
ologist to participate. 
351. See generally Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power 
in Environmental Law, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1443-44 (2005) (noting law’s general 
preference for negative injunctions prohibiting action over affirmative injunctions 
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trast, a negative injunction—ordering the state to cease executions until its pro-
cedure passes constitutional muster—is usually the preferred remedy, because it 
can force constitutional compliance while remaining respectful of the state.352 
Such an order would theoretically assure the court of the constitutionally re-
quired outcome: either the state must bring its execution procedure into com-
pliance with the Eighth Amendment or it must forgo executions. This option is 
the approach chosen by the district court in Harbison, in which the court barred 
Tennessee from executing the plaintiff under the existing protocol but left the 
door open for a future execution with a revised protocol.353  
The negative injunction is an important option, particularly for judges who 
want to steer clear of dictating specific measures to the state. It is worth remem-
bering, though, that the efficacy of the negative injunction is less certain in the 
lethal injection context, because state officials who failed to design a constitu-
tional procedure the first time around may be unwilling or unable to do so even 
under court order. A negative injunction, then, might not give the state official 
the guidance needed to genuinely reform the state’s procedure.354 Although offi-
cials in states with problems typically have given little care to their procedures, 
there is no evidence that any intentionally have designed a dangerous proce-
dure. To the contrary, the finer points of lethal injection fall far outside their 
core competence, and, burdened with other responsibilities, they do not give 
sufficient attention to the complicated procedure. A negative injunction might 
spur better behavior, but it also might merely prompt superficial or inadequate 
changes, as in California and Tennessee.355 To this extent, a negative injunction 
should be monitored closely by courts, particularly in jurisdictions with espe-
cially poor track records. 
 
 
requiring particular action); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law 
Remedies, 79 Geo. L.J. 1355, 1406-08 (1991) (summarizing the competency criti-
cisms of broad injunctive relief in public law litigation); Tracy A. Thomas, Under-
standing Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 Wm. 
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 343, 380 (2002) (“Instead, [critics of structural reform injunc-
tions] argue, federal courts are limited to issuing negative injunctions that simply 
prohibit conduct, [while] affirmative remedies should be the responsibility of the 
executive and legislative branches, which are more competent to make policy de-
cision . . . .”). 
352. See Fletcher, supra note 202, at 649 (“The preferred form of injunction is to in-
struct the defendant not to do what it has been planning or to stop what it has 
been doing.”). 
353. Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 903 (2007). 
354. This attitude might seem patronizing but is realistic given some states’ refusal to 
seek expert assistance. See supra Section I.A; supra Part III. 
355. See supra notes 261-270. 
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3. Administrative Remedies 
 
Yet another alternative is an administrative remedy through a state’s Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA). To receive such a remedy, a plaintiff typi-
cally must demonstrate that the procedures used to adopt the lethal injection 
protocol were inadequate under state administrative law.356 As a formal matter, 
this remedy is only available in certain states, though, because some states insu-
late their executions procedures or correctional facilities from otherwise gener-
ally applicable administrative law.357  
Still, in those states where such claims are colorable, an administrative chal-
lenge provides an important avenue for death row inmates. It also can provide a 
theoretical framework for judges who recognize that the procedures are prob-
lematic but are reluctant to issue a § 1983 injunction.358 Admittedly, most APA 
actions are filed separately from § 1983 attacks,359 so few judges finding prob-
lems with state lethal injection protocols are in the position of selecting between 
an administrative remedy and an injunction. But even where courts are not 
formally presented with APA claims, judges can draw more generally on admin-
 
356. See Arnold Rochvarg, How Administrative Law Halted the Death Penalty in Mary-
land, 37 U. Balt. L.F. 119, 119, 124-25 (2007) (discussing the successful administra-
tive law lethal injection challenge in Maryland). 
357. State statutes exempting DOCs from administrative law are vague enough to al-
low for conflicting interpretations. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.010(6)(k) (West 
2009) (exempting “statement concerning only inmates of an institution under the 
control of the department of corrections” from the definition of a “rule”); Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 4-5-102(10)(G) (2009) (exempting “statements concerning inmates 
of a correctional facility”). But, some state courts have read these statutes to pre-
clude APA challenges to lethal injection. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, No. 07M-
09-141, 2008 WL 1850585 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that Delaware’s 
lethal injection protocol is not subject to state APA); Hightower v. Donald, No. 
2007-135682, slip op. at 4 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 16, 2007) (“[T]he promulgation of 
these protocols regarding lethal injection by the [Georgia] Department of Correc-
tions are not subject to the requirements of the APA . . . .”); Middleton v. Mo. 
Dep’t of Corrections, No. SC 89571, 2009 WL 454279, at *1 (Mo. Feb. 24, 2009) 
(holding that an execution protocol is not a rule and is therefore not subject to 
the State APA); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311 (Tenn. 2005) (in-
terpreting Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedure Act not to reach lethal 
injection). 
358. See generally Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 06-1436, 2008 WL 
4958279, at *7 (Cal. App. Nov. 21, 2008) (declaring lethal injection procedure inva-
lid under California administrative law); Evans v. Maryland, 914 A.2d 25 (Md. 
2006) (declaring the same in Maryland). 
359. These suits are typically filed separately because many state APA statutes require 
that APA suits be brought in state court, while many lethal injection challenges 
are brought in federal courts, which typically allow for more discovery. See, e.g., 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 29 §§ 10102, 10141 (2009); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.110 (West 
2009). 
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istrative law principles in reviewing and remedying those procedures. The po-
litical process failures contributing to the problem invite a judicial order requir-
ing, at a minimum, transparent procedures, greater political accountability, and 
delegation to competent personnel. Since administrative failings by themselves 
rarely amount to a constitutional violation, a judge confronted with a § 1983 ac-
tion will also have to look at the substance of the procedure. But where the evi-
dence suggests real problems, administrative considerations should play a role 
in helping the court identify a violation and craft a meaningful, workable rem-
edy.  
Courts, in fact, should be well situated to rely on administrative principles 
in crafting a remedy. Some judges may be more comfortable ruling on proce-
dural rather than substantive issues involving science or medicine. Similarly, an 
administrative remedy—or even a § 1983 injunction suggesting improved ad-
ministrative procedures—might feel less intrusive to the judge than a tradi-
tional negative or affirmative injunction addressing the execution procedure’s 
details. Indeed, administrative law issues get to the heart of what is wrong with 
many states’ lethal injection protocols. The protocols have been poorly con-
ceived in secret by people who know little about the drugs and who have not 
sought help from experts. These are not admirable administrative processes, 
and, one would hope, improved governmental decision making would yield 
safer protocols.360  
 
B. Remedial Modesty and the Case Against Judicial Deference 
 
This discussion should make clear that workable remedies are more modest 
and readily available than courts assume. For many judges, however, fashioning 
a remedy is a significant obstacle.361 Courts’ reluctance to engage with lethal in-
jection remedies fall into three general categories of objections: concerns about 
intruding excessively on the political branches,362 interrelated concerns about 
 
360. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1959) (arguing that an attention to process is the best guar-
antor that courts will decide cases based on “neutral principles” and reach good 
results). But see Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1013, 1025 (2008) (arguing that too devoted an attachment to 
legal processes “often obscures value judgments about the underlying substantive 
policies”). 
361. See supra Section II.A. 
362. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion) (warning that 
imposing a remedy “would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in 
implementing their execution procedures”); Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 
1037, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“[U]nder the doctrines of comity and separation of 
powers, the particulars of California’s lethal-injection protocol are and should 
remain the province of the State’s executive branch.”); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 
969 So. 2d 326, 351 (Fla. 2007) (stating that the judicial “role is not to microman-
age the executive branch in fulfilling its own duties relating to executions”). 
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the judiciary’s own institutional capacity,363 and concerns about relying on 
street-level subordinates to carry out a judgment. These sources of remedial 
concerns are legitimate and common in public law litigation, but they should 
carry less weight in lethal injection cases than many other contexts.  
 
1. Concerns About Intruding on the Political Branches 
 
To the extent courts’ refusal to reach the remedial stage suggests a discom-
fort with intruding on the political branches, they have not been sensitive to 
reasons why judicial intervention in lethal injection actions is more modest 
than judicially ordered relief in many other settings. By treating remedial con-
cerns as high hurdles in these cases, courts implicitly exaggerate the extent to 
which a remedy would interfere with the internal operations of state institu-
tions. For instance, contrary to some courts’ deferential assumptions,364 intru-
sion into lethal injection procedures would not interfere in more than a mar-
ginal way with day-to-day prison operations. Changes to the execution 
procedure certainly would not affect security.365 Lethal injection is a discrete 
procedure involving only a few prison employees and one inmate at a time. It 
takes place in specially designated rooms removed from the rest of the prison 
population. Prison safety, then, would not be impacted by changing the drugs, 
or by requiring that a member of the execution team have particular medical 
training. Most members of the prison staff, in fact, have nothing to do with exe-
cution procedures.  
Relatedly, a lethal injection injunction would not divert significant 
amounts of money from other government programs or even from within the 
prison. A negative injunction requiring only that the state cease executions until 
it has improved its procedure would allow the state to determine the most cost 
effective way to remedy its procedure. Even an affirmative injunction would 
 
363. See, e.g., Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (warning against “embroil[ing] the courts in ongo-
ing scientific controversies beyond their expertise”); Emmett v. Johnson, 511 F. 
Supp. 2d 634, 639 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 532 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is not 
the office of a federal court to dictate to the Commonwealth of Virginia the pre-
cise methodology it should employ in carrying out a lawful death sentence . . . .”). 
364. See Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 976, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(preparing to defer to state officials on security concerns involving viewing the le-
thal injection procedure absent substantial evidence that a prison regulation was 
an exaggerated response by prison officials); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 
S.W.3d 292, 312 (Tenn. 2005) (noting deference owed to prison officials in a lethal 
injection case to enable them to manage their “tremendous responsibilities”); cf. 
Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (articulating a “unitary, deferential stan-
dard for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional claims”). 
365. See Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 879-84 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that a prison regulation barring public viewing of lethal injection execu-
tion procedures prior to actual administration of lethal injection was an exagger-
ated, unreasonable policy to protect safety and institutional security). 
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likely impose only modest cost. For example, a switch to a one-drug protocol 
would not noticeably change the cost of lethal injection, as none of the drugs 
used or contemplated are expensive.366 If anything, switching to a one-drug 
protocol would make things easier for the states, which would only have to buy 
one drug instead of three and would no longer have to worry about refrigerat-
ing the pancuronium.367  
Even the inclusion of an anesthesiologist would not impose excessive costs 
on the state, especially when compared to costs imposed by structural injunc-
tions. For example, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the total cost for the educational pro-
grams ordered by the district court as part of its effort to desegregate Kansas 
City schools exceeded $220 million.368 In Pennhurst v. Halderman, the Court 
noted that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the relevant statute would impose 
“massive” financial obligations on the states.369 By contrast, Missouri’s Dr. Do-
erhoff was paid only $2,000 per execution,370 and Georgia’s execution team’s to-
tal compensation (including doctors and other personnel) was $18,000.371 No 
state executes enough people for this cost to amount to a sizable annual sum; 
even in a state like Texas, which executes more people than any other state,372 
these costs would be a small fraction of what the death penalty already costs.373 
 
366. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 52, at 134 (explaining that drugs used in lethal in-
jection are “cheap and routinely available”); About Implementing Human Eutha-
nasia in NM Animal Shelters, http://www.nmanimalcontrol.com/euthanasia/ 
HEPP/FAQ.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2008) (noting that average cost of pentobar-
bital to euthanize an animal would be $1.27); Phyllis Coleman, Man[’s Best Friend] 
Does Not Live by Bread Alone: Imposing a Duty To Provide Veterinary Care, 12 
Animal L. 7, 16, n.65 (2005) (discussing the low cost of pentobarbital). 
367. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 876-77 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (noting that 
the refrigeration of pancuronium is a “con” for retaining the three-drug proto-
col). 
368. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 76 (1995). Jenkins is admittedly a controversial 
case, but it provides a striking example of a remedy that asks a good deal of state 
and local government. 
369. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
370. See Kohler, supra note 42. 
371. Gawande, supra note 52, at 151. 
372. See Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas Is Bucking Execution Trend, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 26, 2007, at A1 (noting that executions have declined recently in states other 
than Texas and that, in 2007, Texas executed twenty-six people and no other state 
executed more than three). 
373. Some scholars and state groups have tried to calculate the cost of the death pen-
alty. Illinois State Comptroller statistics, for example, show capital cases costing 
an average of $13.5 million per year, expenses “significantly disproportionate to 
the cost of processing homicide cases in which state’s attorney does not certify the 
case for the death penalty.” Thomas P. Sullivan, Efforts To Improve the Illinois 
Capital Punishment System: Worth the Cost?, 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 935, 964-65 
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In short, lethal injection is not a very polycentric problem, so an injunction 
would be unlikely to have far-reaching public consequences.  
 
2. Concerns About the Judiciary’s Shortcomings 
 
Courts’ reluctance to reach the remedial stage also stems from their related 
sense of the judiciary’s own institutional shortcomings. This concern too carries 
less weight in lethal injection than other contexts, especially in light of states’ 
own failures to engage with their procedures. In other areas, such as prison 
condition cases, prison officials can convincingly argue that they understand 
security concerns far better than judges, and that judicial deference is therefore 
warranted.374 By way of contrast, many state officials do not understand the le-
thal injection procedure they administer and have not given the matter suffi-
cient attention. Under such circumstances, government does not deserve the 
deference it enjoys when it has a genuine expertise over a subject matter. 
By contrast, even though most judges also lack training in the relevant sci-
ence, they will review extensive evidence on the issue. Doing so makes them 
better equipped to understand the dangers and potential remedies than most 
legislators or unelected, unqualified DOC officials.375 Even taking the judiciary’s 
 
(2007). A New Jersey Policy Perspectives report estimated that the death penalty 
since 1982 had cost the State $253 million more than life sentences without parole 
would have. See Mary E. Forsberg, N.J. Policy Perspectives, Money for 
Nothing? The Financial Cost of New Jersey’s Death Penalty 18 (2005), 
available at http://www.njadp.org/forms/cost/MoneyforNothingNoveber18.html; 
see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(“When all is said and done, there can be no doubt that it costs more to execute a 
man than to keep him in prison for life.”); Philip J. Cook & Donna B. Slawson, 
The Costs of Processing Murder Cases in North Carolina 78 (1993), available at 
http://fds.duke.edu/db?attachment-34-1667-view-301 (“The extra cost per execu-
tion of prosecuting a case capitally is more than $2.16 million.”); Glenn L. Pierce & 
Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in American 
Politics, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 711, 719 (1991) (“Each death sentence [in 
Florida] is estimated to cost approximately $3.18 million, compared to a cost of 
life imprisonment (forty years) of approximately $516,000.”); John Roman et al., 
The Cost of the Death Penalty in Maryland (2008), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411625_md_death_penalty.pdf (stating that 
Maryland spends on average $1.9 million more on capital cases resulting in the 
death penalty); Rone Tempest, Death Row Often Means a Long Life: California 
Condemns Many Murderers, but Few Are Ever Executed, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 2005, 
at B1 (stating that the death penalty costs California $114 million a year above what 
it would cost to keep the same convicts incarcerated). 
374. See supra note 200. 
375. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that 
the trial judge’s role as a “gatekeep[er]” of expert testimony is to ensure that the 
claimed basis for scientific testimony is valid); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
323 & n.30 (1982) (holding that an institution would be liable if a decision about an 
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institutional limitations into account, then, many judges are probably more 
likely to engage with the science of the issue than legislators, who are driven by 
political considerations and are more likely to delegate the procedure to agency 
officials.376 Indeed, even if legislatures designed the procedures themselves, there 
would be little reason to defer to their scientific judgment. As one commentator 
argues: 
[O]ne of the chief reasons for allowing legislatures to make findings of 
fact in disputed areas—that they are democratic, representative bod-
ies—seems to have no applicability where issues of pure medical fact 
are concerned. Unlike those cases in which so-called social facts are in-
volved, there is (or perhaps should be) no significant political element 
to the determination of medical fact. This is a fact-finding domain in 
which the interest in public participation and legislatures’ relative insti-
tutional competency are at their lowest.377 
Finally, it should be re-emphasized that the remedies contemplated in these 
cases are usually narrow. They do not require massive reforms from the state; 
they do not cost much; and they do not undermine the death penalty itself. Le-
thal injection plaintiffs can win a safer procedure, but they cannot escape execu-
tion—at least not through this litigation. In light of states’ problems with their 
own procedures, courts are comparatively well situated to deal with these issues.  
 
3. Concerns About Relying on Street-Level Bureaucrats 
 
Another potential judicial concern may stem from the perceived hopeless-
ness of relying on street-level bureaucrats to carry out a judicial decree, particu-
larly in the prison setting. Street-level bureaucrats are generally regarded as low-
level employees, such as prison guards, but, as Professor Lipsky famously ob-
served, they often make the decisions that “add up to agency policy.”378 Some 
commentators have emphasized the difficulties of achieving social and struc-
tural changes, including prison reform, through street-level bureaucrats.379 
 
involuntarily committed ward’s care was not “made by persons with degrees in 
medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training”). 
376. See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 50 Duke L.J. 1169, 1182-87 (2001) (noting that the truth-
discovering value of legislative fact-finding is often undercut by a variety of politi-
cal pressures); B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right To Make Medical Treatment 
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 277, 337, 333-41 (2007) (stating 
that there is “little reason to believe that legislatures possess—or exercise—
superior institutional competency in the context of medical and scientific fact”). 
377. Hill, supra note 376, at 339. 
378. Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual 
in Public Services 3 (1980). 
379. See Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional 
Census of the 1990s, 5 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 427, 506-07 (1997) (“In all bu-
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However, because lethal injection teams usually consist of only a few people 
with defined roles, a judicial order would more likely be followed. In something 
like the school desegregation context, or capital punishment more generally, 
moral responsibility is so diffuse that most involved are unlikely to see them-
selves closely connected to the violation.380 But where a small team of people, 
each with defined tasks, is putting a person to death, a court order is arguably 
more likely to create a culture of accountability and impact the personnel in-
volved.381  
Indeed, if anything, the central role played by low-level execution team 
members renders the need for judicial involvement more pressing and appro-
priate. Street-level bureaucrats are less politically accountable than upper-level 
managers, so countermajoritarian concerns weigh less heavily than when courts 
controvert official agency policies.382 Additionally, and most importantly, given 
the proper mandate, higher-level DOC officials might do a better job ensuring 
street-level compliance if they knew that the court would not permit executions 
without cooperation and if a failure to comply might attract bad publicity.383  
 
reaucracies, the bureaucracy’s mission tends to dwarf competing values” so that 
conversations among bureaucrats are “not likely to be the locus of transformative 
constitutional dialogue.”); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strate-
gies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 805, 816-20 (1990) (argu-
ing that for prison guards, “[a]ll other institutional goals (such as service delivery, 
rehabilitation, and even punishment) are subordinated to and furthered by the 
pursuit of order”). See generally Lipsky, supra note 378, at 3 (identifying problems 
with street-level bureaucracy). 
380. Social psychologists have long studied the diffusion of responsibility and related 
concepts like the bystander effect. See Earl F. Martin, Tessie Hutchinson and the 
American System of Capital Punishment, 59 Md. L. Rev. 553, 562 (2000) 
(“[T]hough the interplay in capital cases between jurors, trial judges, and appel-
late judges gives the appearance of a system that squarely faces the gravity of its 
task, the diffusion of responsibility between these actors enables them, and us, to 
avoid having to experience fully the monumental decision to kill another human 
being.”); Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. Abnormal & Soc. 
Psych. 371 (1963) (suggesting that individuals minimize their own moral agency 
to the degree they believe they are simply following instructions). 
381. Cf. Bibb Latané et al., Many Hands Make Light Work: The Causes and Conse-
quences of Social Loafing, 37 J. Personality & Social Psych., 822, 823 (1979) (ar-
guing that, in bigger teams, individuals’ efforts and feelings of responsibility 
dwindle). 
382. Kreimer, supra note 379, at 506-08. But see Roger A. Hanson, Contending Perspec-
tive on Federal Court Efforts To Reform State Institutions, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 289, 
303, 317-18 (1988) (suggesting that courts’ inability to control street-level bureau-
crats undermines the efficacy of institutional reform and hence judicial legiti-
macy). 
383. As Professor Ely has explained, on hard issues most elected representatives 
“shrewdly prefer not to have to stand up and be counted but rather to let some 
executive-branch bureaucrat . . . ‘take the inevitable political heat.’” Ely, supra 
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Conclusion 
 
Several remedial options are available to fix lethal injection procedures 
without intruding excessively on the states. And yet, despite the significant risk 
of pain resulting from many states’ lack of transparency, care, and deliberation, 
most courts have assumed that any remedy would be onerous and have de-
clined to find a violation. This restraint is excessive. It considers only the dan-
gers of judicial meddling, not the dangers of judicial abdication. 
The institutions in control of lethal injection have proven inattentive, in-
competent, and nonetheless resistant to change, and courts are institutionally 
well situated to remedy the problem. Indeed, in such circumstances, courts are 
often the only institution that can secure necessary change. Professors Denno 
and Berman are correct in calling upon the political branches to re-examine 
their procedures,384 and, ideally, states will respond to these challenges. Unfor-
tunately, though, some states have chosen to retain the status quo unless forced 
to do otherwise.385 Such obduracy and lack of transparency create an “immunity 
to political correction”386 necessitating judicial intervention.387  
Courts should also take into account the extent to which a remedy may 
have far-reaching consequences. When an injunction would affect many 
spheres of public life and prove very disruptive to non-parties, courts should be 
 
note 283, at 132 (quoting Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the 
Political Process, 84 Yale L.J. 1395, 1400 (1975)). But when courts find fault with 
governmental policies, thereby drawing the media’s attention, elected officials are 
more likely to get involved to address the problem. See, e.g., Press Release, Office 
of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Issues Statement on Lethal Injection 
Protocol (May 15, 2007), http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/6237/ (Gover-
nor responding publicly to court-identified deficiencies in the lethal injection 
protocol). 
384. See Douglas A. Berman, Finding Bickel Gold in a Hill of Beans, 2006 Cato Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 311, 330-31 (noting disappointment at legislative inaction since Hill); Denno, 
Quandary, supra note 28, at 117-23. 
385. See supra Part III. 
386. Sabel & Simon, supra note 225, at 1064. 
387. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 414 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the more uncooperative the government is in correcting constitutional violations, 
the more necessary judicial intervention is); Fletcher, supra note 202, at 637 (con-
cluding that the presumption of illegitimacy for structural injunctions is over-
come “when the political bodies that should ordinarily exercise such discretion 
are seriously and chronically in default” and that in such cases “judicial discretion 
may be a necessary and therefore legitimate substitute for political discretion”); 
Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 217, at 1389 (arguing that structural reform in-
junctions should be “presumptively available when it provides the only effective 
remedy for constitutional violations”); Mishkin, supra note 213, at 949-51 (arguing 
that institutional decrees are justified when there is a clear constitutional violation 
and they are the only available remedy). 
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especially wary. But not all public lawsuits involve such polycentric problems. 
Accordingly, when a remedy is narrow and creates few subsidiary problems, it 
should not be treated like an invasive institutional injunction. These distinc-
tions are especially important when courts’ misperceptions color not just the 
scope of remedial discretion but also the content of the constitutional right it-
self.  
Many courts to date have mistakenly assumed that a lethal injection rem-
edy would be overly invasive, but is well within their equitable powers to do a 
better job considering these issues.388 Indeed, our system reserves an important 
role for courts to oversee the other branches.389 Admittedly, it will not always be 
easy to gauge the state’s good faith (or lack thereof) or the degree to which a 
problem is polycentric. States in lethal injection cases, for instance, cite even 
minor reforms as evidence of good faith390 and, similarly, are likely to cry foul 
whenever a court imposes any remedy.391 Nevertheless, although these factors 
will not always be easily administered, it is important that they factor into 
judges’ deliberations. Given the extent to which remedial concerns color judges’ 
attitudes towards the merits, courts’ initial survey of the remedial issues should 
appreciate the multi-faceted nuances that favor and disfavor judicial interven-
tion. Increased recognition of these issues is, admittedly, only a small step to-
wards correcting the misperceptions that have plagued much lethal injection 
litigation, but such a step could help courts guard against a reactionary assump-
 
388. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978) (“[S]ince all or almost 
all equitable remedies are discretionary, the balancing of equities and hardships is 
appropriate in almost any case as a guide to the chancellor’s discretion.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (“In shap-
ing equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary power . . . .”); 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Once a right 
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers 
to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equita-
ble remedies . . . .”). 
389. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 48, at 256-57 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & 
James McClellan ed., 2001) (arguing that unless these branches of government “be 
so far connected and blended, as to give to each a constitutional control over the 
others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free 
government, can never in practice be duly maintained . . . .” and that, if left un-
checked, the legislature will extend “the sphere of its activity, and draw[] all power 
into its impetuous vortex”); Scott D. Gerber, The Court, The Constitution, and the 
History of Ideas, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1067, 1082 (2008) (citing Federalist No. 48 to ar-
gue that judicial review imposes an important check on the political branches that 
is necessary in a system of separation of powers). 
390. Cf. Jones v. McAndrew, 996 F. Supp. 1439, 1450-51 (N.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that 
defendants’ good faith efforts to revise the electric chair protocol following 
botched execution demonstrated lack of deliberate indifference). 
391. See, e.g., Defendants’ 7/14/2006 Submission of Proposed Protocol at 11, Taylor v. 
Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035  (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006)  (arguing that 
the court’s remedy is “much broader than necessary”). 
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tion that any action requesting a public law injunction necessarily would re-
quire something intrusive and far-reaching.  
Additionally, attention to these issues can help judges clarify when and why 
they should engage in self-restraint. Judicial restraint is an important constitu-
tional value that quite appropriately arises at various stages of a case. When 
courts appeal to these values, however, they often do so as if restraint applies 
identically when determining the right and when issuing a remedy.392 But judi-
cial restraint seems less appropriate when a court with jurisdiction hears evi-
dence suggesting a constitutional violation. In such circumstances, excessive re-
straint can cause the judge to turn a blind eye to a serious infringement of 
rights. By way of contrast, at least in the lethal injection context, restraint may 
be more appropriate when a court has found a violation and is choosing be-
tween various remedies, some more intrusive than others.393 As lethal injection 
challenges continue to work their way through the judiciary, courts should 
therefore carefully consider the remedial questions at the outset of the case. It 
might be unrealistic to expect all courts to dramatically change their approaches 
to these cases, but self-awareness can yield substantial reforms.  
 
392. See supra Section II.A. 
393. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 217, at 1411 (discussing courts’ imposition of 
narrower injunctions in part due to judicial restraint concerns); Sabel & Simon, 
supra note 225, at 1019, 1038 (discussing recent developments in constitutional 
remedies, including departures from command-and-control regime). In different 
contexts, commentators have argued that courts should be less deferential when 
formulating a remedy, because, at the remedy stage, it should focus on the harm 
suffered by the victims. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public 
Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 Hastings L.J. 475, 552 (1999) 
(“Deference to the wrongdoer elevates the defendants’ interests to an explicit part 
of the remedial calculus, rather than keeping the remedy focused on redressing 
the rights of the victims.”); Poser, supra note 109, at 324-25 (“[A]lthough the 
Court continues to insist that the scope of the right determines the scope of the 
remedy, the separation of the two has resulted in a desegregation jurisprudence 
which is currently rooted in the purported limitations on equity rather than the 
opportunity of equitable remedies to correct rights violations.”). 
